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Patton's Assorted Manure Piles? - Printable Version +- Forums (https://www.theblitz.club/message_boards) +-- Forum: The Firing Line (https://www.theblitz.club/message_boards/forumdisplay.php?fid=1) +--- Forum: Campaign Series (https://www.theblitz.club/message_boards/forumdisplay.php?fid=8) +--- Thread: Patton's Assorted Manure Piles? (/showthread.php?tid=39375) Pages:
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RE: Patton's Assorted Manure Piles? - Don Fox - 03-02-2007 "He's considered "great" because his American fellows were...not. " If you are talking about his contemporaries, I think if you stopped to reflect on it, you could write substantive list of "great" generals in the American Army of 1944-45. While Patton had his weaknesses, he also had his strengths (exploitation and pursuit being the key strength). Few, if any, generals at the time would have been so willing to push through Avranches with the speed and forcefullness that he demonstrated (he did not have the advantage of historical hinsight to know just how badly the German left had been shattered, so to push several division through in such short order took great daring, indeed). Soon after demonstrating his brilliance, however, he faltered by directing his spearheads into Brittany, instead of heading east, into the German vitals (though to have not done so would have run counter to his directives from above; but then again, Hodges had directed him to stop near Avranches to cement open the gap, and Patton found it within himself to ignore that directive). His eventual turn to the east was extremely well executed; he had the 4th Armored primarily to thank for it, but Patton deserves credit for unleashing XII Corps to move so quickly and violently toward the Siene River and beyond. Many generals would have been much more conservative, and would certanily have been tremendously concerned about their flanks. Short on supplies (gasoline), he had the vision to see the opportunity before him, and pressed his army on when most generals...on either side of the battlefield...would have stopped. Keep in mind that this stage of the advance was not a matter of some imposing, temendously superior force careening across the Franch landscape. We are basically talking about two armored divisions and two infantry division at this point. They accomplished more than what their numbers would normally suggest would be possible. And it was not the unnopposed romp that some paint it out to be. Upon reaching the Moselle, there is a great lesson to be learned about Patton. The experiences of the XII and XX Corps couldn't have been more different. In the case of XII Corps, a brilliant envelopment of Nancy is executed, and when the Germans launch a counterattack with superior numbers, the Americans beat it back brilliantly. In the case of XX Corps, a strumbling approach to the Moselle is made, with little coordination between the two primary divisions of Walton Walker's corps (5th ID and 7th AD). This stands in stark contrast to the coordination between the 4th AD, 80th and 35th ID's. Where was Patton's influence at this time? Which corps was the better reflection of Patton's abilities? If one is quick to credit Patton with the incompetence displayed near Metz, then he must also be credited with the brilliance at Nancy. Truth be known, Metz is more a reflection of Walton Walker's ability to manage XX Corps, while the Nancy engagement was primarily a reflection on the fighting ability of P Wood (4th AD), and to a lesser extent, Manton Eddy (CG of XII Corps). Patton's biggest error came with the start of the November offensive. While weather and terrain conditions imposed hardships, it is arguable that Patton did not prepare an effective plan to breach the German defenses. Of course, the germans themselves deserve credit for the defense they mounted. But the most serious offense committed by Patton was his failure to concentrate his armor. The Bulge counterattack is certainly Patton's most famous deed, and reflects his flexibility (though arguably, he displayed some initial weakness in that regard at the outset). I have always found it interesting, however, that many people have a false impression of how he turned his army north. All three of the divisions that launched the initial attack on December 22 were out of the line already. What was indeed a great move on his part was anticipating the need to send III Corps north, and to have pre-issued orders prior to his meeting with Eisenhower at Verdun. He didn't have to make that move...he did it on his own initiative, and in the end, it saved significant time. I would be at the leading edge of those who criticize him, however, by saying that the form the attack took was less than inspired. He could have easily consolidated his spearheads, and delivered a more telling blow...and arguably in a more compelling axis of advance. At any rate...I think those in this thread who fall into the camp of categorizing Patton as a weak aor average general are greatly mistaken. I do think there is tremendous weight in the opinions of his opponents, and with that in mind, it is hard to say that a better general existed in the American ranks (at least at the Army level; I can certainly make the argument that there were Major Generals of higher competence) RE: Patton's Assorted Manure Piles? - Montana Mud - 03-02-2007 RE: Patton's Assorted Manure Piles? - McIvan - 03-02-2007 Oh I think Don Fox and Digger both gave a much better outline than my sketchy remarks. Full credit to them for very thoughtful opinion pieces: well said! RE: Patton's Assorted Manure Piles? - Mr. Guberman - 03-03-2007 Don, Agreed, your description goes very far to describing his possibility of being "average"...but with great respect, I do not believe it goes to describing one who was "above average". Audacity, audacity...was and is found in many generals who for other reasons did or did not achieve victories...or course, I believe it was Napoleon who said he would not give a rats ass for a general who was not lucky... respectfully curt |
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