(08-07-2021, 03:15 AM)ComradeP Wrote: The regiment is a dummy organization without an HQ, similar to that used for the artillery units. That shouldn't be causing the issue.

The flags and unit type for Japanese and US mortar units are identical, so it's not an OOB unit setting.

Changing the organizational unit size of the mortars or the regiment doesn't solve the issue.

As to OOB errors:

-The Japanese 93rd Division's Recon Battalion has a replacement rate of 93%.
-The Japanese 201st Division's 501st Infantry Regiment has a replacement rate of 501%.

Quote:Mortar issue is a known bug of gold version. Any time you put a mortar unit into a "unit folder" in the OOB that unit can only use other units in that unit folder in the OOB as spotter.

Quote:unonimus:

Mr. Freer,

Some problems that were found in Japan '45 and Japan '46 in the previous version hasn't been fixed (Not that it's hard to fix, but manual editing of scenarios and OOB shouldn't be forced, I think.).

For Japan '45:

216th Division comes twice with strategy choices and French Expeditionary Corps and Navy comes after the end of the scenario.

For Japan '46:

The additional replacement value for 93rd Recon Battalion and 501st Infantry Regiment. It shouldn't be there.

Will there be a hotfix(? or 4.01?) for that? Or should I re-download them to see these problems fixed?

By the way, units can draw opportunity fire by trying to assault even though they don't have enough movement points or they are not able to assault (like artillery). Is this intended? I have tested it on both PzC and MC.

I actually asked the J '45 one to Rich, but since I forgot mentioning the thing in J '46 and I found the last bug (or feature?) yesterday, one can pretend I didn't ask anything to Rich.

Response from Strela:

Hi there,


I am reviewing these.

David

Quote:ComradeP:

One minor OOB issue with Japan '46: the 38th Infantry Division's artillery has "/32" instead of "/38" at the end of the battalion designations.

Quote:Elxaime:

Another couple of items for the Japan 46' WDS version for a future patch and/or consideration:

1. The mysterious minefield deep in Japan at 123,2 is still there in the Operation Coronet campaign game.

2. On the Japanese militia and partisan units, they are all subordinated to a single HQ, the 12th Area Army. While the 12th Area Army, based in Tokyo, has a pretty long command range, this essentially means these units - if they want to stay in command range (which is highly recommended) - can only cover the middle of the map (albeit a big part). This seems counterintuitive, since these units are organized by prefecture, some of them start fixed and release from quite a distance from Tokyo, and the nature of militia and partisan units is that they have the flexibility to operate throughout a country (especially the partisans). There is a "Volunteer Fighting Corps" in their chain of command, but no HQ exists for that. Suggest the designer do a sweep of the militia and partisans and consider reorganizing their command structure. This could include adding further "sector" commands (e.g., a "West Volunteer Fighting Corps" and "East Volunteer Fighting Corps") or perhaps HQs based on prefectures. You may also want to examine whether the units of the Tokyo prefecture - there are a lot of them - would be divided into sub-commands. Right now, you can't really consider an irregular war since the units can't stray past the range of their single HQ, the 12th Area Army. You may also want to, consistent with any reorganization, consider whether some of these units would start further south, e.g., on the two peninsulas on either side of Tokyo Bay, since the way the release schedule works, the Japanese player may not have time to get the slow-moving militia and partisans down to these areas before the Allied offensives cut them off (this is more an issue with the SE than the SW, since the Japanese naval infantry in the SW are very strong and that area is hard to breach). All of this begs the 30,000-foot question - how do you want to model any possible Japanese irregular forces? As minor or non-factors? Merely good for digging and holding rear areas? Or as a more potent threat? If the latter, you may want to consider making the smaller 50-man partisan companies a bit larger.

3. Allied post-landing naval "end runs" and airborne drops. Playing the Japanese, one of the things that bothers me is that, once they release, I can move all the rear area units to the front line and not have to worry about holding those coasts or be worried about Allied airborne drops. It would be nice to give the Allies some strategies to keep the Japanese side honest. You may need to add additional Japanese reinforcements subject to use of these options. One fascinating thought might be to model a Soviet intervention via sea, land or air, later in the campaign (including the Soviet Navy). Anyway, these strategies could allow use of US, British and French special forces.

4. On the Western Allied fleet, Japan 45' includes some attrition of these vessels to account for Kamikaze attacks, suicide boats, etc., but this effect is absent in Japan 46'. I am not saying yea or nay, but wonder why this is, and whether this was an oversight?

5. A regiment of the Japanese 321st Division sits on O-Shima Island, and there is a supply source and VP hexes there, but basically it is just fluff. When considering adding strategies, you may want to consider some options for this situation. For example: a) tie any attrition effect on Allied ships (mentioned above) to the Japanese holding this island (it would be assumed this was part of the Japanese being capable of and putting resources into this approach, so it models what is there in Japan 45'); b) allow Japan to withdraw these forces to the mainland to use them there, at a VP cost (this assumes the Allies then occupy O-Shima without a fight); c) if Japan stays, give the Allies a strategy to launch an invasion of O-Shima with a force that may otherwise not have participated (e.g. a Commonwealth or Nationalist Chinese Regiment). Just some thoughts. It seems strange to just see them there for fluff.

Response from Green:

James,


Thanks for the feedback. As I mentioned to ComradeP, the experience you both have with this campaign makes your input invaluable. At this stage work is still on-going with J45, so J46 has yet to be looked at. The primary focus is to make adjustments that provide balance, following the revision of the default rules. This needs to encompass the entire game and not just the campaign. Of course we want to balance the campaign to the extent possible but given the 600 turn time-frame the difficulties are immense. The realistic scope of this project will not include and major re-working of the original design. For example, adding units that are not a part of the existing OOB is not intended as part of this review.

Here are my initial thoughts on the points you raise:

1. These mines will be removed.

2. ComradeP has suggested that Militia and Boeitai units should be Fixed for the duration in their own city. Partisans are different but to what extent would these units have been controlled or coordinated by a higher HQ? In the Notes for the game it says that "Partisans were bypassed soldiers and specific teams left behind to disrupt any Allied advance". This does not suggest a force that should be provided with good command and control. At first glance the game reflects what is intended but perhaps I am missing something.     

3. The timing of the release of Fixed Japanese units is definitely something that can be looked at but additional landings or airborne operations is beyond what is planned. Some clear 'historic' justification would be needed. But I agree that it could make an interesting what-if variant to the historic plan. 

4. Lack of naval attrition was not an oversight. The idea is that the Japanese would have thrown everything at the initial landings on Kyushu. But this is something that could be looked at if you think it is an issue.

5. A solution is needed but it should to be simple as we are only talking about one regiment. There is no way in game terms to tie naval attrition to the Japanese holding the island. Perhaps if they are seen as serving no purpose they should just be removed? Would transporting them from the island have been a realistic option?

Anyway, when the time comes to work on this, your points can be considered more carefully. If anything occurs to you in the meantime, let us know and we can add it to the list.

John

(12-06-2021, 03:18 AM)Elxaime Wrote: Another idea or two on victory conditions. 

You may want to consider creating sudden death victory for the Allies if they have captured enough major key points.  Similar to how it is done with the surrender of the Netherlands in Prucha France 1940.  Japanese politics were increasingly factionalized by this time and there would likely be a "peace party" willing to reach terms once it was obviously hopeless.  The key factor here is that both Japan and the western Allies did not want the war to drag on long enough to enable a Soviet force to join the fray (and thus also gain a role in the post-war occupation).  There is evidence the Japanese elites sincerely feared a communist take-over if things got really bad.  Japanese victory should be based on holding these key points and staving off sudden death.  Various levels of Japanese victory should be tied to how long they can do this, with holding until the end of a game constituting a major Japanese victory.

The sudden death triggers should be affected by loss ratios, with the Japanese being heedless of losses while attempting to inflict enough losses on the Allies to wear down home front morale.  I am not sure if the game systems are flexible enough to do this, but the sudden death loss thresholds can be affected by the current loss ratios.  For example, the Allies have just captured key points X and Y, which add to the chance of a sudden death end to the scenario.  But sudden death is only enabled if Allied VPs from losses are not more than fifty percent of Japan's (or less, as turns go on - typically Japan loses about 3 to 4 men to every 1 of the Allies).

The problem with just using vanilla VP calculations is that, like Normandy 44', once the Allies are ashore in force it is merely a matter of time.  Which is true to life in a military sense but misses the pressing political calculations.  Sudden death victory possibility for the Allies, assuming they don't incur crippling losses along the way, could add spice to the mix.