Quote:Along the Gette River, Belgium, 18th August 1914:

Following the fall of Liège, the Belgian Armée de Campagne began solidifying a line of defense along the Gette River.

On 17 August, von Moltke issued instructions to von Kluck to shoulder the Belgian Army away from Antwerp. However, to complicate things, von Kluck was also told that his 1.Armee would be under the orders of 2.Armee's commander von Bülow. The cavalry, under H.K.K.2, would also be reassigned to the 2.Armee to provide security between the two advancing armies. Von Moltke's justification for this was that the 1.Armee and 2.Armee must remain in close proximity during their advance on the north side of the Meuse, so that a gap between them would not form.

Von Kluck was furious and argued that it was his 1.Armee, which was on the flank, that had the strategic challenges necessitating independent action, and as such, required the full use of the H.K.K.2 on the northern flank. But this was to be ignored and von Kluck was forced to drive a wedge between the Belgians and Antwerp with his hands tied.

Historically, the Belgians withdrew to the River Dyle in the afternoon and early evening of the 18th, shortly after Haelen and Diest was taken by storm and their flank was exposed, with the 1er Division d’Armée being the primary force engaged. HRH Leopold II recognized that the Germans were trying to drive a wedge between his army and Antwerp and, shortly after the line along the Dyle was established, ordered a withdrawal. On the 19th of August his army conducted a skillful withdrawal to Antwerp, arriving there by the 20th and thus avoiding the trap.

This scenario ends at the point where the Belgians began falling back to Antwerp.

The main objective for the Belgians is to keep as many German units from exiting the map to the west, and, where possible, hold the objectives to prevent a total rout of the Belgian Army.
The Germans can choose to drive off the Belgian's left flank around Haelen by taking the objectives concentrated in that area; it is assumed that a successful wedge is driven between the Belgians and Antwerp if the Germans can take all of those objectives. The Germans can also choose to bypass the Belgian line and gain points by exiting units on the western map which is the route to Bruxelles. By doing this it should balance out any failure on the Germans to drive the Belgians away from Antwerp, but it will probably not gain them a major victory.
 

(12-09-2021, 03:57 AM)ComradeP Wrote: ...
What was the most difficult decision for you as the attacker in this scenario?
...

(12-10-2021, 06:14 AM)phoenix Wrote: Nice AAR. Thanks. Can I ask which graphics mods you're using, and where I can get them - they make the map so much clearer that the original graphics.

Quote:November 4, 1945  -  Location: Southern Kyushu, Japan

This campaign scenario depicts the Operation Olympic plan which was to invade the island of Kyushu for use in the second part of Operation Downfall as a base for aircraft and ships. The Allies knew that the Japanese already anticipated their plan and had based an enormous force on the island. What they didn't know was the exact location of the Japanese reserves. The Japanese were careful to disguise their fortifications and troop locations. Any attempt at taking Kyushu would come at a stiff price.

This campaign scenario includes Strategy choices for both sides. Different starting locations can be chosen for the Japanese reserves and the Allies have some choices in invasion locations.

The Japanese have Partisan units that enter on the map with a scatter value for variable hex entry.

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With the completion of the campaigns for Okinawa and the Philippines by the end of May 1945 the Allies had drawn much closer to the home islands of Japan. There existed a difference of opinion on whether they should invade Formosa, mainland China or strike at the Japan itself.
With the carrier strikes of Halsey’s fast carrier force, to include British carriers, on airfields throughout Japan the threat of the Kamikaze planes was thoroughly addressed but never totally resolved. General Curtis LeMay’s B-29s had bombed most of the Japanese cities into rubble. The question came: should the Allies invade Japan at all?

One option that the Allies explored was to blockade the home islands. This would keep them from having access to the majority of the crucial raw materials that they needed in order to keep their war machine running. A second option was to invade Japan and conquer it by a protracted land campaign. Another option was to use the atomic bomb. As history has written the final option is the one that the Allies chose. With the dropping of two atomic bombs the Japanese government caved in and surrendered.

Other options were on the table as well but with the unconditional surrender policy in place a negotiated peace was out of the question. Japan must surrender to the Allies and face the consequences of their actions. The Allies would occupy Japan until such time that they felt that they could trust Japan to be a full time, peaceful partner in the years to come.

This title addresses the option to invade Japan instead of using the atomic bomb. The possibility that the Manhattan Project would not have been able to complete a bomb was very real. While the teams were composed of some of the most brilliant minds of their time they had suffered setbacks along the way. What if the project had failed to deliver an atomic weapon by the summer of 1945?

The invasion of Japan, codenamed “Operation Downfall,” was one that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, headed by General Marshall, and the other Allied leaders dreaded mainly because of the casualties it would have cost the Allied forces and the significant amount of resources it would have required. Not only were the US forces stretched to the limit but the system of allowing veterans to be released from duty and sent home left the ranks of the standing US Army and Marine divisions semi-depleted of seasoned officer and enlisted men. The manpower pool for the Allies was limited by the end of 1944 due to the fighting in northwestern Europe. By 1945 the US replacement system was stretched to its limit. The movement of troops, supplies and equipment sorely taxed the US rail and shipping system. Add to it that the other allies had been fighting longer than the US and their contribution was limited in this regard as well.

The island of Kyushu is composed of steep, rugged terrain with many of the hillsides containing rice terraces and dense woods. Rapid, mechanized movement would be next to impossible. Tall, volcanic mountain ranges dominate the interior of the island. The best roads were located along the coast. The rail system, which by the time of the landings would have been heavily damaged, allowed for limited movement. The numerous railroad and highway tunnels allowed for the concealment of forces during daylight hours.

There were a wide range of suitable beach locations for the invasion forces. The Allies had identified six prime locations that they could use and finally settled on three that they would use. This would work to disperse the Japanese defense forces to some degree but the rugged nature of the terrain inland meant that any early advantage gained from the drive inland from the beaches was offset by the limited mechanized movement due to the mountains and high ridges.
A decent interior road system gave the Japanese the opportunity to use their interior lines to their advantage. While rapid movement during the day was out of the question due to the Allied airpower they could use the darkness of the night period to transfer their forces unhampered by the incredible air arsenal of their enemy.
The US planners had identified Ariake Bay and especially the Kagoshima harbor as key objectives during their planning. These deep water areas would be used to supply the attacking forces. While it would take some time to make them usable their access would be invaluable in the later part of the campaign.
 

(07-15-2022, 11:41 PM)LordDeadwood Wrote: Love the GIF's! Great AAR.

Quote:1914_0906_01: Fighting Fire With Fire (2nd Invasion)
Macva Peninsula and surrounding areas, Serbia, 6th September 1914:

Following the stunning defeat of the Austro-Hungarian first invasion of Serbia in August, Austro-Hungarian forces withdrew west of the Drina to lick their wounds and reform.

A dispute then formed in Austro-Hungarian high command where Conrad insisted that the remainder of the 2.Armee be sent to Galicia, while Potiorek insisted that it remain for another invasion. Strategically the greater threat was the Russian Army in Galicia, however politically the defiant Serbians were more important. The political argument won out, primarily due to the fact that the entire cause of the conflict was to bring about a lasting solution to the "Serbia problem", and because Austro-Hungarian failure discouraged Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire from entering the war. To that end, a compromise was made where two divisions of the 2.Armee remained in place for another campaign while the rest was removed for Galicia.

Potiorek prepared for another invasion to be commenced on September 7th, but the Serbians happened to strike first with an offensive of their own. The French and Russians had been pressuring Serbia to go on the offensive and, not wanting to be suicidal, Serbia initially refused but eventually came to the realization that an offensive would be necessary to encourage both France and Russia to supply them with vital shipments of arms and ammunition. To fulfill this request, on September 6th the Serbian Army launched a limited offensive into the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in the fertile region of Syrmia north of the Sava River. In addition, the Serbians also planned something they had themselves wanted to do: a secondary, albeit delayed, offensive into Bosnia which would have the goal of "liberating" Sarajevo and causing havoc on Austro-Hungarian supply lines.

Like fighting fire with fire, the end result was a double offensive as both sides attacked; the Serbians in reaction to somewhat unrealistic allied demands, and Austro-Hungarians as both a spoiling attack and a desperate second attempt to conquer Serbia.

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This scenario uses the limited objectives feature. The objectives north of the Sava (in the region known historically as Syrmia). The objectives there will expire after so many turns and will be removed from the map. When this happens their ownership and points will be applied permanently in the state when they expired (in other words, whoever owns the objective at the time of expiration will permanently be awarded the Victory Points). This means that the Serbians must act in a timely manner to take these objectives, and the Austro-Hungarians must do their best to delay and deny their capture. Once the objectives are removed, neither side has any reason to fight over the area and this is represented by the historical fact that strategic emphasis changed as the campaign progressed. Historically, when the objectives expire the Serbians began immediate withdrawal of Syrmia, to hastily move those units to reinforce the battle that was now raging in the Macva Peninsula.

The successful capture of many of the Syrmian objectives (those north of the Sava) by Serbian forces would have represented a successful fulfillment of their obligation to Russia to apply offensive pressure on Austro-Hungary. The possible points gained from this offensive helps negate any Austro-Hungarian gains at the end of the scenario, thereby requiring the Austro-Hungarians to take more objectives for a victory. In essence, it is a high stakes game where the Serbians must take some risks (the exact risk level is up to the Serbian commander) in order to put more pressure on the Austro-Hungarians to have to accomplish more at the end of the campaign. As mentioned, the number of Syrmian objectives the Serbian commander wishes to push for is up to him, but bear in mind that historically the Serbians recognized that they had to quickly move to reinforce the 3rd Army, so it is a careful economy of force type dilemma. That said, it is imperative that the Serbians try to take as many objectives in Syrmia as possible, given that the scenario begins in a draw situation. If the Serbians ignore Syrmia, then the best result they can realistically hope to obtain at the end of the campaign is a draw (which is unlikely given that they would be expected to hold all their starting objectives east of the Drina by the end of the Austro-Hungarian offensive!).

The Serbian Timok I Division's starting disposition must be explained. Basically, the division was assigned to cross the Sava on the left front of the attack into Syrmia after a long approach march to the river from the Bogaric area. Unfortunately the already fatigued division's crossing was opposed by one of the better Austro-Hungarian divisions in the area: the 29.InfanterieDiv who stayed behind when the k.u.k. 2.Armee left for Galicia. Half of the Timok I Division crossed the Sava by small rafts during the evening and night of September 5th on a one way trip, expecting a pontoon bridge to be built behind them during the day. During the day the Timok bridging engineers continued building their bridge only to discover that they did not have enough bridging materials available to finish it properly it (the bridge extended to about 50 meters short of the far bank when it was "completed"). The Serbian 13. and 15. Infantry Regiments attacked as they were told, running into the entire Austro-Hungarian Infanterieregiment Nr.74 who was, in its entirety, attending Sunday church services in Sascini (hence their strange starting deployment). IR.74 sprang into action and checked the Serbian advance, while the rest of the 29.InfanterieDiv converged. For the rest of September 6th and part of the 7th a battle was fought as the 29.InfanterieDiv strangled the Serbian 13. and 15. Infantry Regiments out of existence, with their backs to the Sava and very limited supplies able to reach them from the partially complete pontoon bridge. In the end Serbian soldiers either surrendered or tried to swim across the Sava, drowning as they attempted to reach the unfinished bridge that was now under fire from Austro-Hungarian forces. The commander of the Timok I Division was relieved of duties in disgrace (and even imprisoned) following the action, due to it being determined that his failure in command effectively caused half of the division to be destroyed. For the Serbian Army who did not have the resources of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the loss of two full regiments of I Ban infantry was a catastrophe of epic proportions. The Austro-Hungarian Army celebrated the event as "the destruction of the Timok Division at Sasinci".

As the Serbian commander, it is possible to save the cut off 13. and 15. Infantry Regiments (henceforth referred to as the Jarak crossing). You can either proceed with a ferry and boat crossing of the rest of the division at Mitrowitz with the goal of supporting the units at the Jarak crossing. However this is an "all-in" choice that may risk the destruction of the whole division, or it may allow the division to solidify for a better chance of extracting it via boats, ferry, and completed pontoon bridge. Another alternative is to not risk the Mitrowitz crossing at all and cut your losses, but to hold at the Jarak crossing until the pontoon bridge is fully completed (which is rationalized to represent the bridging unit acquiring more materials from the nearby forest). And finally, you could choose to continue the attack at both crossings with the goal of linking up with the rest of the Serbian 2. Army attacking in Syrmia to the east.

The Danube II Div arrived late for the attack on Symia (8 September). By this time the Austro-Hungarians had started their own second offensive across the Drina and historically the Danube II Div was diverted immediately south towards Pecka and transferred to 3. Army to help hold back the advance of the k.u.k. 6.Armee. The Danube II Div arrives in the location when it was diverted south so that the Serbian commander can either choose to do this historical move, or add it to the Syrmian offensive for greater momentum.

The k.u.k. 21.Landwehr InfanterieDiv was in a special situation following the 1st Invasion of Serbia. This is the same division that in August was routed off of Mount Cer and nearly destroyed. In the period between the 1st and 2nd invasions, this division was prioritized for replacements and swelled in strength from an estimated 40% to 80% strength and recovered much of its losses. However one thing that could not be easily replaced was professional leadership which was instead replaced with reservists and landsturm cadre at this time. To represent this, during the 2nd invasion the division's brigade HQs are -1 level in quality.

The Austro-Hungarian k.u. 109.LstIBrig. (6.Armee) is withdrawn on September 16th (random probability, so the withdrawal may get delayed). This withdrawal represents the historical pressure being placed upon the Austro-Hungarians in Bosnia. By that time the Serbians had invaded Bosnia and were advancing on Srebrenica, so the Austro-Hungarians pulled this brigade back to protect the right rear flank of 6.Armee. This is also why the k.u. 109.LstIBrig's starting area is closed off with impassible hexes - in order to prevent the Serbian commander from doing something gamey and advancing into the rear of 6.Armee after this brigade withdraws (historically the brigade would have been able to react to any Serbian advance in the area).

Note that historically the Austro-Hungarian second invasion was planned to begin with an advance by the 5.Armee on September 7th, but for technical and logistical reasons Potiorek delayed this until September 8th (which is when 6.Armee was scheduled to advance), so in this scenario both armies are fixed until September 8th. The Serbians are advised to use this delay to their advantage by taking what they can in Syrmia before considering a redeployment of their 1. Army to counter the Austro-Hungarian offensive.

As the Serbians, take precaution to protect your pontoon bridges from Austro-Hungarian river monitors. The way you protect the bridges is by leaving your field artillery in key positions along the Sava River, so that the monitors will have to run the gauntlet to get to the bridges, either severely damaging or destroying the ships as they pass, which will be very expensive in Victory Points for the Austro-Hungarians (one of the heavier monitors can be worth from 30 to 40 Victory Points each). Note that the monitors can crash through and destroy pontoon bridges, but they have to be adjacent and have to have full movement allowance available. One effective way that bridges can be protected is by placing field artillery in the hex adjacent to the pontoon bridge so that it is able to mass fire on the monitors as they stop to prepare for ramming the pontoon bridge. If your pontoon bridges are destroyed, then you can either choose to bring up other bridge units to build more, or strictly use full hex ferry crossings, or engineers with boats (although your supply situation north of the Sava River will suffer significantly if no pontoon bridges are available). Also, although the Serbians may not be able to sink any or all of the Austro-Hungarian monitors, the monitors are valuable and damaging them can still yield a high level of Victory Points.

The Austro-Hungarian 5.Armee (Macva Peninsula sector) should be completely methodical in their Drina crossings - this is an attritional fight! Their first goal is very limited: to gain a foothold across the Drina, and then solidify it, constantly looking to expand out slowly, where they can, but never pushing so hard that they exhaust themselves, or else they risk a collapse of the bridgehead. Primarily their objective should be to survive. Even if the 5.Armee doesn't advance far, its bridgehead and presence will force the Serbians to tie down equal amounts of forces against them, which means those forces cannot be sent to fight the 6.Armee to the south.

The Austro-Hungarian 42.Honvéd InfanterieDiv moved south immediately and crossed the Drina near Batar. Consider this option as it will spread out the Serbians, but it will also spread out Austro-Hungarian forces as well. Another advantage of this move is that the Serbs do not expect it, and the Serbian division opposite of this area (Drina II Div) is not released until the 11th, allowing the Austro-Hungarian forces to establish a safe and secure bridgehead before making contact with this division at the time of their choosing. If you decide to cross the Drina near Batar, the Austro-Hungarians are advised not to move forward towards the Sor-Kozjak until the 42.HID is completely established, because line of sight will cause the Drina II Div to release immediately!

The Austro-Hungarian 36.InfanterieDiv at first moved to cross the Drina opposite of Badovinci and Klenje. It suffered losses, and then withdrew, then moved south and crossed again in front of Prujavor, which again met heavy resistance again and stalled. If the XIII.Korps moves south, then the Austro-Hungarian commander can decide from several options. Additionally, attacking across the Drina and withdrawing, to rest and attack somewhere else later does have a benefit of keeping the Serbians guessing. An unaccounted division is a threat to them. Attacking in several places along the Drina prevents the Serbs from being able to concentrate, and spreads their attention to several bridgeheads rather than just one or two. There is also a benefit of delaying the XIII.Korps crossings for some days (historically this corps was slow in its crossings), as this also keeps the Serbians guessing, and may tempt the Serbians to weaken the potential crossing areas as they move to reinforce other places.