Visibility & Airstrikes

[Von Earlmann]

I fully support Huib's views on visibility.

+1

HSL

+2

VE

[Askari19]

I'm on board with Huib, and also offer some more observations, from several years in a U.S. ARNG air defense battery (M-42 Duster SP 40mm, so basically WW2 technology) and some flying experience.

Navigation in poor weather is one thing; ground attack something else entirely. As in one anecdote on this thread, under WW2 conditions close air support under a low-ceiling overcast was possible. I assume this could only be represented by a reduced visibility range in CS, but you could build the assumption into scenario design if you wish. Two factors pertained:

1) Tactical aircraft can't navigate by instruments to the target location; strategic bombers tried this in WW2 and routinely missed by miles.

2) When you drop below the clouds, you have limited time to acquire the target, and that much less time to line up for a gun, rocket, or bombing run. If you're out of position, you have to either risk ground fire swanning about at low altitude, or pull back up into the clouds and lose your target orientation again.

-- this suggests that in CS, if you assume a low ceiling, it would be good if you could lower the "65%" chance per turn of a planned strike arriving, AND/OR increase the odds of effective AA fire, AND/OR increase the "scatter" probability. Don't know if that's possible. If not, just reduce the number of airstrikes available - your guess as good as anyone's, for how much to reduce it.

If the weather you're concerned about is worse than just low cloud cover - rain or snow squalls, fog, etc. - all the same arguments pertain, except that the likelihood of a planned strike occurring is even less. Best answer again would be to offer the player the original number of strikes (assuming the airfields have clear weather) but drastically reduce the probability of their arrival, and their accuracy. "Good enough" answer is to drastically reduce the number of airstrikes.

I really, really agree with the comments that visibility in CS is usually excessive, and really x3 agree with the observation that it is very unrealistic that every unit has equal FO capability for all air and artillery. If one thing in the whole CS air support and indirect fire rule set could be changed, it would be to limit FO capabilities to particular units, and regulate the responsiveness of air and indirect fire units, reflecting their national and organizational capabilities and doctrine. (And we think rules like "EA" affected play balance! Watch what happens when Soviet artillery becomes rigidly inflexible, and American artillery takes its rightful place as King of Battle.)

Cheers,
Bill