Krak Wrote:I don't doubt Rommel had huge supply problems in NA. I have read widely on the subject. But I still don't buy your ascertion that it was impossible for him to reach Alexandria even if 8th Army simply was no longer there. That statement contradicts a great many people who were there at the time. From my reading Rommel did not get there because 8th Army stopped him. I feel to say that it mattered not is a slight against the great many who sacrified their lives in the endeavour to stop him.
:chin: I think you're trying to contort what I said into something I did not. Bravery and honor have nothing to do with supply and demand, and the science of logistics. Men who wore the uniforms of any nation, allied or axis, are worthy of respect based upon their actions, and in the particular case of 8th Army, very high respect that is. But again, what's that got to do with the math of moving materiel?
Krak Wrote:If other registered users of this site make such statements it matters not to me. But when a high ranking official of the board makes a statement like that I feel it necessary to counter it. Less read individuals might be inclined to take your word as fact. Offering an arguement to your ascertion hopefully will encourage them to read up on the subject themselves and deduce their own conclusions.
Most war gamers I know are fairly well read, myself included. What's more I happen to have been to school for, and spent 26 years of my adult life in the business of logistics, so I think I know a thing or two on the subject that qualifies me to talk about it.
Krak Wrote:If commanders like Rommel, Manstein and even dare I say it Hitler had always listened to so called 'saner' advice then astonishing victories like France in 1940 or Gazala in 42 (or defeats like Bulge and Kursk for that matter) would never had occurred.
We will never know if the Germans could have made Alexandria. Because 8th Army stopped them and threw them back. But 'I' can't believe that the Germans would not have found a way to get there had they destroyed 8th Army and the path there lay clear of resistance.
Strategically, had the allies lost Alexandria then the Royal Navy would have lost control of the Eastern Med. Thereafter a far better supply situation for Rommel would have ensued. Alexandria and Port Said were major supply depot's and port's. What a disaster had they been lost.
Anyway I am not offended or anything. I just think a statement like that is a bit over the top so to speak. No hard feelings or anything.
It's not about feelings. It's about math. The science of logistics.
In 1942 Rommel's Army had a demand level of roughly 60,000 tons per month. In the last 6 months of 1942 the Axis managed to off load a monthly average of 56,000 tons per month. That's a little short but let's not quibble. Now these supplies needed to be trucked to the Alamein position. That's a distance of @ 500km from Tobruk; @ 1000km from Benghazi; and @ 2500km from Tripoli
Take the Opel Blitz tanker trucker now. It's capacity is @ 4500L. It consumed 30L/100km in fuel, plus another 4L/100km in other POL products. So this truck, carrying 4500L of fuel, is consuming 170L fuel and POL to drive from Tobruk to Alamein, plus another 170L to drive the truck back, add in 10% for wastage and evaporation and our 4500L truck is consuming 790L (or 18%) of capacity delivering it's cargo.
Bad, but not tragic yet. But that's Tobruk. If the same truck is coming from Bengahzi it's consuming 1130L ( or 25%) of capacity delivering it's cargo. And if the same truck is rolling from Tripoli it's consuming 1550L (or 34%) of capacity delivering it's cargo. And historically not a lot of fuel moved in tankers for the Germans. Most of the limited tankers were assigned to the mobile formations, and as a result regular trucks moved fuel in drums, which is more inefficient (fuel weighs 6.11 pounds per gallon, but in a drum it weighs 7.41 pounds per gallon, or roughly 18% more) so your trucks are really starting out with about 3690L not 4500L, and delivering 2900L from Tobruk, 2560L from Benghazi, and 2140L from Tripoli.
And all this assumes that there has been no loss from interdiction, combat, mechanical breakdown, etc; nor have we moved the first bullet, or the first ounce of food, or spare parts. And those trucks, since they're not fuel trucks that can sustain their own movement, are going to drain off some of the fuel from the forward depots that your fuel trucks are dropping off.
I could go on, but I hope I've illustrated the point. The Axis was barely managing to get what it needed shipped across the Med by 1942, and getting it moved forward from the port facilities it had was consuming unsustainable percentages, so that the end result was a PanzerArmee Afrika that was barely existing in a static condition at Alamein, and the amounts of materiel required for it to move offensively beyond that point simply could not have been delivered.
So, if you would like me to concede your point that had 8th Army surrendered or otherwise disappeared could Rommel get to Alexandria, then sure I'll concede that. But in strength, and in any position to hold the Delta from the forces that the British would have moved in from the Trans-Jordan, East Africa and/or India if necessary? Not hardly. The entire NA Theater was dictated by logistics and how much could be supported and sustained in theater. The Axis never broke the code and that is why they failed there. Even the allies, who were awash in supply at the ports of debarkation, had problems moving it forward and their offensives (like the Axis') always ended up being stopped as much for supply issues as combat issues.
Archived Forums
Help
Calendar
Member List
Search
){kind=link}
