"Come back here ya coward, it's only a flesh wound..." SFS Round 2 Sitrep Thread!!

[Toten Tanz]

Title: Analysis of 28th/18 Panzer Regiments actions July 3, 1941, Col. Eckhardt (Toten tanz) commanding
Location: Lipki, Belarus (Terror At Borisov)

The actions on July 3, 1941 secured routes out of the Borisov area for German forces, as well as destroying Russian forces in the area. The 28/18 Panzer Reg. was successful for 3 main reasons:

1) Observation and Intellegence - The Regiment's recon elements provided timely and accurate information on enemy movements and troop concetrations. Throughout the day, Col. Eckhardt placed his units in postions that afforded them good observation of enemy avenues of approach and movement. With these units, he was able to not only see where the enemy was, but where they were not. This allowed him to make somewhat accurate estimations on the size and direction of movement of Russian units and Russian intentions. Overall, the loses in the 88th/18 Recon Btl were relatively light. It was not until late mid-day that it started to suffer its heaviest casualties. Additionally, Col. Eckhardt was able to deny the Russian commander vantage points, from which to watch the Regiment's movements. With concentrated fire, and determined manuevering, he was able to repeatedly drive back Russian attempts to place units in observation points.

2) Concentration of force - Col. Eckhardt was able to concentrate his tanks so that throughout the day, he had the advantage of superior numbers at the point of contact. The Russian commander never committed to a concentrated attack at several places, simultaniously. He threw his forces in piecemeal, thus never pressuring 28/18 PZ as a whole. This allowed Col. Eckhardt to shift units back and forth to where the next threat lay. Only during 4th Co, II/28th Pz Btl. action in and around Stayki, early in the day, were Col. Eckhardt's unit out numbered once contact was made. As a result, 4th Co. suffered the heaviest casualties in the Regiment. Most of the time the Regiment enjoyed 2 or 3 to 1 odds when engaging the Russian tanks. During the intial actions against the T-34s on Lipki Ridge, Regimental forces enjoyed a 4.7 to 1 (43 to 9) advantage against the technically superior Russian tanks.

3) Russian over confidence in their armor and gunnery - Interrogation of Russian POWs has shown that the Russian commanders put too much faith in the technical superiority of thier BT-7s, T-34s and KVs, and not enough on fire and maneuver. They massed their units into tight formations when in the attack. Repeatedly through out the day, Regimental forces were able to flank and surround Russian tank formations, allowing them no escape. Once in this position, the Panzertruppen took advantage of the weaker side and rear armor and decimated the Russian tanks. Additonally, it has become clear that the Russian commanders were frustrated at the fact that German leaders were able to place their tanks in postions that negated the superior firepower of the T-34s and KVs. The leaders in the Regiment should be commended on the fact that they were able to apply their leadership abilities at the proper time in the proper place to effect the outcome of the battle.

Effective combat strength of 28/18 Pz Regminent at end of day, July 3, 1941

I/28 Pz Btl, 41 Tanks operational
10 MkIIs
22 MkIIIs
9 Mk IVs

II/28 Pz Btl, 25 Tanks operational
2 MkIIs
16 MkIIIs
7 Mk IVs

88th/18 Recon Btl
90 Motorcyclists Effective (10 walking wounded)
30 Pioneers Effective
2 50mm ATG
7 PSW 222
2 PSW 231 (8 Rad)
2 75mm Inf Guns

88th/18 ATG Btl.
4 50mm ATG
2 37mm ATG
7 PzJg 1