CMBB v CMAK

[Nikita]

My words:

"I prefer to read books, referring to official reports of engineers and officers, responsible for comparative testing and analysis of related first-eye reports from the front. Things look very different, than in general memoirs. And one should also remember that tank is not only gun and armor."

Yours:
"Things certainly do look different on the battlefield instead of on a testing ground. That I will agree with you on."

Please read up once more what I have stated, especially the bolded section and reconsider your irony.

Please read up once more, how many new model tanks and how many older model tanks were present in Soviet Army in June 1941. I will help you: from 10349 up to about 11000 in 19 mechanised corps in Western regions of USSR according to different sources. You can add on top tanks from cavalry divisions and (according to June 1, 1941) you will receive figure of 12 782. So I suggest you should revise your statements about the backbone of Soviet tank forces avalibale at the front.

I think you are also unaware, that Russians had only 150 (one hundred fifty) well-prepared crews for T-34s by June 1, 1941, using only 38 tanks out of more than 800 available. Figures have changed by the 22nd, but only slightly. (reports were roduced on monthly basis and all other figures may be inaccurate, presumably, 135 tanks could have been supplied additionally).

Now back for the front accounts:
Battle of Dubno, the biggest early war tank battle, included Soviet 8 and 15 Mech. Corps. Those units had totally 2156 tanks, out of which 181 T-34 and 140 - KV. But up to 50% of those new tanks did not participate in the counterstrike due to poor repair and evacuation services for new tanks. The results for Soviet forces was almost complete annihilation of tanks in both units, although tey were able to achieve some tactical successes. I saw no reports of AP ammo deficit. Neither for those units, nor for, say 4 MC, headed by infamous Vlasov, which had 313 T-34s and 101 KV.

On the beggining of August, 1941, Soviets were able to have 235 T-34s battle ready, plus 116 T-34s in reserve units. Lack of tanks forced to keep OOB mixed. But even relatively well equipped tank brigades, which had even "hunter tanks" with 57mm maingun, like 21st tank bridage, although had some successes, were finally overcame by German infantry and tank units (they reported inflicting about 1000 infantry, 34 tank, 210 cars, 25 guns losses) but brigade was almost annihilated in the process (you can see related CMBB scenario Kalinin Raid).

During Moscow battle, volumes of T-34s were low: for examle in the beggining of October 1941 the western Front had 483 tanks, out of which only 45 were T-34s and KVs. Things remained rather similar in 1942. They were present in bigger numbers during beggining of Stalingrad battle, due to obvious reasons: presence of Stalingrad tank factory.

T-34 became the main workhorse of Soviet army only in 1943, comprising about 2/3ds of the soviet produced tanks, present in Kursk battle.

As you understand, technical specifications and idea of producing Panther was already realised. As I stated previously, ideas to bild Tiger and Panther were not influenced by presence of T-34 as such. It was planned as a response for future developments in tanks of all states, fighting Germany. Surely, T-34 was considered as one of the most dangerous opponents Germans have met, but it was not the only one. Finally, the only feature, that Panther shared with T-34, was slopped armor.
BTW PzIV with long 75mm maingun was able to defeat T-34 and proved itself as extremely dangerous opponent during Manstein's drive to Stalingrad.

If you speak about soviet impression of PzIV in 1940, I understand again, that you have read some high ranking memoirs. But I suspect you are unaware about Soviet impressions from PzIII and origins of T-50, because this fact is not in the popular history. Soviet amazement of "heavy PzIV" was caused by the fact, that several countries (including USSR) were building up heavier and better armored tanks at the moment.

As for 100-122mm for IS-2: my statements basically repeat discussion of meeting of GKO as of October 31, 1943, when resolution No 4479cc stated, that 122mm should be used, because it has not only acceptable anti-tank capacity, but is also better siutable for "soft targets". However, this decision was still questioned and resolution of GKO as of Dec. 27, 1943 No. 4851cc again returned to armament of IS-2, allowing to test improved 85mm and 100mm guns. Finally it was decided, that although 100mm D-10 has better ROF, theoretically has better penetration and is more accurate, overall performance of 122mm was considered being more siutable. Both 100mm guns (D-10) and 122mm (D-25) were mass produced.

The main problem with CMBB engine, depicting Soviet tanks, especially T-34, is spotting abilities, which in game engine, although considering absence of commander cupola, is far superior to real life.

As for general views, I would advice you and everybody interested, to read David Glantz and Newton books on the subject of overall performance of both Red and German armies. Newton is more keen to research separate operations, Glantz covers strategy as well. Newton is very good at critical in-depth review of German commanders and their command decisions, while Glantz was always specialising on Soviet side.