CMBB v CMAK

[Nikita]

Sorry, but you are writing simply too much, it is too difficult for me to follow you everywhere.

Steven Zaloga is not the best available source for Russian armor. Ask him personally, if possible for such names as Michail Svirin or Baryatinsky and then post his comments here. Figures, that I was stating, are from books, written by people, tank engineers, working in Russian archives more frequently, than Zaloga.

Again: you are making mistake of usual diletant, comparing calibers and armor thickness, and disregarding other factors. Untrained crew, for example, may be simply uncapable of driving tank and T-34, especially early model or KV, are very difficult to drive. Or, when driving, Due to better transmission German tanks enjoyed much better mobility. T-34 had extremely poor spotting ability. If repair was needed, the untrained crew will have difficulties to repair. And such difficulties are becoming even bigger, if you count the fact, that evacuators, available in OOB of Russian MCs, were not capable of driving such heavy tanks, as T-34. I am sure, you are not aware about the time limits for Russian tank engines, used in T-34 at the time. etc. etc.

I need to state to you again, that tanks are not necessarily fighting tanks. OOBs are fighting. Tank battles are much more seldom, than tanks fighting enemy ATs, artillery and infantry. German artillery, including 37mm, were quite capable of knocking-off earlier Soviet tanks, that formed the backbone of fighting force in border battles. I know, what backbone means and can not buy argument, that much more times numerous tanks, than T-34 r KV can not be considered as such, just because T-34 or KV armor is thicker. Light tanks were the main fighting power, the workhorse of Soviet MCs of the period. As for T-34s, it still could be defeated with decreasing difficulty 50mm guns, divisional artillery and flaks, should that become necessary.

As for Luftwaffe: do you know, how many tanks they have killed? They have affected marches and organisation, but not much tanks themselves.

Power of German tank and infantry divisions was combined arms warfare, employed by veteran troops, which were fighting for 2 years on different theaters (especially the command chain). And the quotes, you are stating, prove that, it is a pity you can not analyse them completely. Surely, if masses of Soviet tanks achieved local superiority, by "overfilling" German anti-tank capacity sometimes, they had successes, but, as I said, they were too low on supporting infantry and artillery to consolidate it.

For tank production and OOB:
Production of T-60 up to 1943, accepted for military service:
5796
T-70 - 8226
You should also count tanks of other models, produced during pre-war times and losses of almost all T-34s, available at the beggining of 1941. I gave you figures, available at the front. Production figures alone are good, but somewhat misleading. I also need to re-check Production of t-34s for 1941 and 1942 and will come up[ later.

I can not understand, why you are neglecting Baryatinsky statements about actually deployed new model tanks out of commissioned for service? Again, please provide other statements for low AP rounds supply, than Zhukov's memoirs. BTW he was not stating it there like you do: this was not presented as a universal situation.

Where did yo get such universal rule for Russian OOB? For example Katukov's brigade, formed up in September in Stalingrad, had only 16 T-34s (which was rather high due to close preence of Stalingrad tank factory) out of 49 tanks. general volumes of T-34 by the end o 1941 was about 25-30% of total tank volumes. It slightly increased in 1942, but not everywhere. 61army before Bolhov offensive of June 1942 had only 20% of T-34s compared to tanks, avalable to them.
At Kursk in 1943, in both Central and Voronezh Fronts T-34s comprised 62%, becoming main fighting force.