FM WarB Wrote:It can be argued that if the Germans had plunged on to Moscow, leaving large intact forces on their southern flank (which they decided to encircle and destroy) they might have been in worse trouble, come winter.
Once the Germans failed in front of Moscow, it was over, especially with the U.S. entering the war. That the Germans fought so hard and well, and lasted so long is a testament to their tactical superiority over their foes.
A valid point (about trying to grab Moscow instead of diverting south to Kiev), but if one buys the idea that at least through 1941 the Germans enjoyed a huge superiority on the battlefield, then leaving the Kiev forces to be dealt with after Moscow is a risk worth taking. The Russians counter attacks in 41 prior to Moscow were horribly executed, and even in front of Moscow it was as much weather as the Red Army that stopped the Germans, so the Kiev forces left around Kiev could have been dealt with...if not safely...with acceptable risk, if the stragetic transportation center of Moscow is captured.
With Moscow in hand, the strategic movement of the Red Army is crippled.
Yes, the General Staff estimated Barbarossa poorly, but I do admire their attempts at execution. Who else would have had even the audacity to try? For me it's as exciting a tale as Alexander in Persia or the Romans against the known world. As the SAS say, Who Dares, Wins (well not always, but you get the idea) ;)