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Entry 5
The Events of Early October 1861
In this communiqué, the first order of business if for me to thank our patriotic citizens. These past months have not been easy for any of us, in particular our fighting men at the frontlines of this dastardly War of Yankee Aggression. Sadly, many of our young, in the flower of their youth have fallen bravely on the field of battle. But I want to reassure all of you have sacrificed for the cause: these brave me did NOT die in vain! As God is my witness, I stand before you ever more resolute in the conviction that the Grand Confederate States shall NOT become slaves to the vapid Yankee bureaucrats and high rollers! We SHALL OVERCOME!
My fellow patriots, we have ONLY JUST BEGUN to fight! and we have the Yankee Legions at Bay! We have taken control of Southern Missouri, liberating our plantation owning Brethren.
President Davis’ Topline Summary
We have taken control of Southern Missouri and Kansas liberating our plantation brethren in that fair state from the depradations of the evil Jayhawkers, and Gov Hall. We are quickly moving some of our Divisions and 1st Corps into place to punish the Kentuckians for their treachery. In the East, our Army of the Potomac and supporting Divisions hold firm in their ramparts on the Dixie side of the Potomac. Based on our Intelligence Staffs assessment of Union newspapers, our advances in the Greater Ozark Region have not set well with some of the Governors in the region, and this should put a significant thorn in Mr. Lincolns hat band.
Illustration # 1 Mr. Lincoln’s Western Despair
Strategic Overview and Planning for the Destruction of the Yankee Aggressors
At the end of last month, we were in a good state of affairs, with our Armies having pushed back the Yankees north of the Mason-Dixon Line in most areas of the continent.
Illustration # 2: Strategic Military Status of Early October 1861
Our future objectives are to conquer Topeka, Jeff City, St. Louis, and Cairo, and to build three forts along the Mississippi River to protect these cities. This will be our primary overarching goal for 1862. Our secondary goal will be to—at minimum—prevent the development of any Yankee forts in Kentucky, and if possible to occupy the Capitol of KY thus depriving the Yanks of any resource benefits from that state. These are lofty goals, but I believe that we can accomplish them by this time next year.
Report on Our Grand Internal Developments
It is the role of the President to make a number of very important decisions about the allocation of National subsidies for internal developments and building. These are important matters over which I weigh many small and large considerations.
Our overall war effort demands two things primarily: more units in the field, and more replacements to maintain the strength of our existing units. While the former can be accomplished through simple Musters, or if necessary Conscription, or the payment of a professional enlistment, the latter can only be accomplished by constructing additional Camps in our lands. It is a heavy burden on our Govs to support Musters as it on them that the worst of the repercussions from the families fall. Similarly, in the event that a conscription action incites unrest as it did in Selma some months ago, it is the Governors whose attitude is most dramatically impacted. As the President, I have to weigh these factors, because all of our Govs are important. We need their support for a variety of purposes, but to have a governor like Brown of Georgia whose outspoken opposition to our efforts to muster troops from Georgia is frankly bordering on rebellious
Illustration # 3: Our Southern Governors
Frankly, it is my sincere hope that Gov Brown will NOT be re-elected next month, because there are a number of influential citizens in several of Georgia’s towns who have assured me of the high probability that they could either facilitate the formation of new Brigades or Impressment of critical war materiel were it not for Gov Brown’s obstruction of all my efforts in that State.
As President is my prerogative to place requests with the Mayors of our Cities and their Governors to Muster or Conscript new Brigades, and/or to attempt to Impress various war materiel (money, labor, horses, or iron). These decisions have be made by weighing the relative value of the requisition to the overall war effort, relative to the negative repercussions.
Unless the call for conscripts provokes civil unrest in a province, conscription will always be 100% effective, whereas the chance for a successful Muster varies between 10 and 90%, as do Impressments. What distinguishes Impressments and Conscriptions from Musters is that, because they place a substantial burden on the citizenry, these requisitions always have some chance of provoking civil unrest, which is very bad thing because it effectively shuts down the economy in a province.
Illustration # 3a: Deciding When, Where, and What to Impress/Conscript/Muster
As you can see from Illustration #3b, it is not difficult for any given two-week period for my staff and I to sort out what materiel might be requisitioned from which city, the relative risks of unrest provoked by conscripting or impressing, and the relatively probability of Mustering. Our Governors are central to Mustering in that they generally appeal to the States Citizens patriotism on behalf of the CSA and consequently Mustering always lowers relations with the Governors by some amount: one can ask a friend for a favor but to ask too often and one may no longer have a friend In some instances a Governor may be supportive of the Muster, in which case the impact on our friendship is lessened.
In the above illustration, you can see that I have sorted our list of cities by the level or Risk, and I have selected to ask Governor Harris of TN and the Mayor of Nashville to attempt to Conscript a Brigade based on the low probability that such a conscription might cause unrest. I have also sent a request for Mustering of some excess horses in Little Rock to Governor Rector. Here also, the chance of unrest is fairly small (20%) the chance of successful impressments is large (80%) and while our relations with Gov Rector are already strained (he is a “Mild Adversary” with an attitude of -27 toward my administration), a further reduction in his attitude is a cost I feel willing to accept at this time because he is master of a fairly inconsequential state, and he faces reelection in 1862.
The President faces similar decisions about how to assign Generals to Military “Containers” (Armies, Corps, Divisions) and which Brigades to assign to each container. I will cover these matters in some detail in future Entries.