Question for VM re alt scenarios

[bwv]

From my M44 alt scenario description:

-Standardized Russian and Russian-Guards unit quality ratings. Russian line units are given D quality and Russian-Guards units are given C quality. For the most part this is already true in all PzC titles with the exception of a few units, usually given B quality for play balance purposes. With the McNamara OOB based changes, this is no longer required. Obviously, the quality standardization results in some Guards units changing from B to C but it also resulted in just as many Guards artillery units (and other supporting units) changing from D to C. It also resulted in many Russian units changing from E to D. This was all done for several reasons. Firstly, it is a logical assumption that a Guards division distinguished itself in battle, therefore it should be rated higher. More often than not, Soviet units had high casualty rates so instead of some divisions being high quality, the organizations as a whole remained at a standard level but unit leaders (HQ units) would be higher rated if it was a “good” unit. The other reason it was done is to remove the feeling of uniqueness within the Red Army (where, before, some units would be good quality and some would be terrible quality). Instead the emphasis is placed on quantity, the “horde”, individual unit ratings (of the formidable Russian medium and heavy tanks and their artillery), and HQ unit ratings.

Several books (such as von Mellenthin’s “Panzer Battles”) make the observation that the Red Army lacked individualism which is characteristic of western armies. This lack of individualism produced an almost automaton adherence to doctrine without any creativity whatsoever at the tactical level. The real strength of a unit was in how it was wielded at the strategic level. The individual fighter in the Red Army was, either intentionally or not, submerged into the “crowd” or “herd”. To that end, there is no real justification for Red Army units to be of sporadic quality levels between B and E but, rather, a standard average quality of C and D for combat units and varying quality levels ranging from excellent to terrible for individual HQ, based on their ability. These quality levels for HQs affect many variables and, given that “out of command” or “detached” units produce realistically severe effects (ie. artillery spotting by detached units get reduced artillery strike effectiveness and detached units gain less replacements), these individual HQ ratings can thus be extremely important. As mentioned above, this standardized quality approach takes focus off of individual unit’s (battalions) effectiveness and instead treats them as a collective

.

Is this really historical or just a stereotype? - how much credit can you give a German general like Mellenthin who was likely predisposed to see the Russians as a faceless horde? Everything I have read by Glantz, Erickson and others points to a wide disparity of unit quality, particularly in the early years of the war - from fanatical resistance on par with the Japanese to disordered mobs. The guards units late in the war should IMO be of comparable quality to the elite units of any army.

Glantz wrote in 1986:

One of the most influential postwar German war critiques was General von Mellenthin’s Panzer Battles published ln English in 1956. Mellenthin’s work, an operational/tactical account of considerable merit, echoed the criticism of Hitler voiced by Guderian and showed how Hitler’s adverse influence affected tactical operations. Beyond this, Mellenthin’s work adopted a didactic approach in order to analyze operations and hence educate officers. Throughout the book are judgments concerning military principles and assessments of the nature of the Soviet fighting men and officers, most of which have been incorporated into the current “body of truth” about Soviet military capabilities. Hence, Mellenthin made such judgments as these: the Russian soldier is tenacious on defense, inflexible on offense, subject to panic when facing unforeseen eventualities, an excellent night fighter, a master of infiltra- tion, a resolute and implacable defender of bridgeheads, and neglectful of the value of human life. As was in the case of Guderian, Mellenthin’s experiences against the Red Army encompassed the period before spring 1944 and reflected impressions acquired principally during years of German success.

Mellenthln’s work, written without benefit of archival materials, tended to treat tactical cases without fully describing their operational context. Opposing Soviet units, as in Guderian’s work, were faceless. Mellenthin’s classic account of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps’ operations along the Chir River after the encirclement of German 6th Army at Stalingrad stands as an example of the weaknesses of his book. In it he describes the brilliant operations of that panzer corps in fending off assaults by Soviet 5th Tank Army’s units which included first the 1st Tank Corps and later 5th Mechanized Corps. On 7-8 December 1942, 11ch Panzer Division parried a thrust of 1st Tank Corps at State Farm 79 while on 19 December, 11th Panzer checked the advance of 5th Mechanized Corps. Despite the vivid accounts of these tactical successes, Mellenthin only in passing describes the operational disaster that provided a context for these fleeting tactical successes. For, in fact, while Soviet 5th Tank Army occupied XXXXVIII Panzer Corps’ attention, to the northwest Soviet forces overwhelmed and destroyed the Italian 8th Army and severely damaged Army Detachment Hollidt. Moreover, Mellenthin did not mention (probably because he did not know) that Soviet 1st Tank Corps had been in nearly continuous operation since 19 November and was under strength and worn down when it began its march across the Chir.

Similar flaws appear elsewhere in Mellenthin’s work, many of which result from a lack of knowledge of opposing Soviet forces or their strengths.

http://internet128.com/index.php/2006/09...r-battles/

Maj Timothy Wray also criticizes the distorted view of the Soviet army that came from relying solely on German sources:

the shallow knowledge of Western analysts is often based as much on myth as on fact. A major reason for this is that Western knowledge of the Russo-German War has been unduly influenced by the popular memoirs of several prominent German military leaders. While interesting and even instructive to a point, these memoirs suffer from the prejudices, lapses, and wishful remembering common to all memoirs and, therefore, form a precarious foundation on which to build a useful analysis. For example, even though Heinz Guderian’s Panzer Leader and F. W. von Mellenthin’s Panzer Battles regularly appear on U.S. Army professional reading lists and contain interesting insights into German military operations, each book paints a somewhat distorted picture of the German war against Russia. These distortions are the result of outright exaggeration and misrepresentation (as is common in Guderian’s work) or the omission of important qualifying data and contextual background (as is more often the case in Mellenthin’s book).

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/...y/wray.asp