HPS NB vs. Battleground

[JasonC]

I deny it. I claim that none of the sources you mention had the slightest idea either how French infantry formations worked nor of the flexible meaning of the terms used to describe them.

Column meant anything that had one of anything behind another of the same scale. Line meant anything that had similar subformations beside each other. Division meant both a unit above a brigade and any formation split into 2 equal halves deployed beside each other. Moreover, everyone from Napoleon on down used analogy to how a battalion deployed its companies in various standard formations, to describe all larger formations - to the point of calling a formation of 6 corps arranged in operational marches "a battalion square".

The only thing eyewitnesses relate with clarity is that the formations were 20 ranks deep. Which is exactly the aggregate depth of the formation I described above. And that visually they formed 4 giant integrated columns, column here in the sense of deeper than line formations with dressed front. Which fits my description. Moreover, several eyewitnesses explain that the front line French infantry were in the act of deploying further into line when the British cavalry struck them. Which makes no sense whatever if they supposedly already were in line.

The term used by the French to describe the formation was column of divisions by battalion. Column of divisions at the battalion scale meant each battalion was divided into 2 equal halves ("division" in the second sense) and these divisions were placed next to each other, each as a 3 deep column of companies, each in turn (as always) in 3 rank line. I claim the analogous meaning for a division scale formation was each division divided into 2 equal halves, each deployed beside each other, with their next level subunit - regiments - in column one behind the other. In this analogy the brigades of the division correspond to the half-battalions ("division" in the second sense) of a battalion-level formation of companiesa, and regiments (next level down) correspond to companies. It is an analogy exactly similar to Napoleon speaking of 6 corps as being in "battalion square". It is a "column of divisions" in the battalion-level sense raised 2 echelon levels in scale.

I claim each division was in such a formation, with the divisions themselves in line beside one another. The frontage of the whole therefore 8 regiments, with another 8 behind them. We know the whole formation was 20 ranks deep, and a regiment deployed in full column is instead 18 ranks deep on its own. A regiment deployed in column of divisions, however, is only 9 ranks deep, and this is the obvious reason why the whole was 20 ranks deep front to back. (The extra 2 are due to rank closers etc).

Chandler in particular is hopeless on such a point. He claims the attack was unsupported by cavalry. Then says cavalry ought to go first (lol). Then overlooks the Hanoverians having been cut up by the blown Cuirassiers, who were hit first by the British charge on the French left before the infantry was and which didn't get there because they were having a picnic. He ignores the fact that another Cuirassier division supported in rear and the French lights on the right rear. He ignores the fact that as supports they practically destroyed the British cavalry for what it did to the infantry and its overextending itself. That is kind of what "supported" means. He repeats the myth of Highlanders riding stirrups in the Grey's charge, a piece of Scots all getting confused. He says the French infantry "fought like lions" when eyewitnesses say they broke and began running before the Brit cavalry actually reached them. In short, there isn't a line Chandler writes about the subject that can be trusted to be accurate rather than myth peddling.

Most accounts also neatly overlook the infantry fight that preceeded the Brit cavalry charge and how it was actually going. The Brits were not winning it. Picton was killed. The front line of allied battalions had already broken. The second was standing, and the French infantry were in musket fire contact, and some subformations in second line were attempting to deploy further.

The charge was particularly well timed in that respect. There isn't the slightest truth to the pretense that the French formation was failing due to artillery fire or the fight with the allied infantry alone. Quite the reverse actually. But they were caught at just the right moment by just the right arm. And their numbers did not suffice to counter that - the most fundamental fact about Napoleonic era tactics is that they practically never did, and the paper scissors rock of combined arms relationships dominated numbers. Which doesn't happen nearly enough in HPS, but did in BG.

Cavalry was not overpowered in the BG system. If anything, there wasn't enough outright morale failure just for being in a charge threat zone and not in square - which in the real deal was often enough to cause outright rout, not just disorder or failure to make it to square. (The VP points for cavalry were also ludicruous and still are, but fortunately are editable. Unchanged they practically prohibit all cavalry attacks on anything but enemy cavalry. Which needless to say does not reflect the era reality). Moreover, the surround melees characteristic of the system before the soft ZOC etc "reforms" of HPS, were also decidedly realistic.

The Brit cavalry took 3000 French prisoners in the course of their charge. In the BG system, that sort of thing actually happened. In HPS, not so much...