German Army Research

[Osiris]

The lack of officers and NCOs in the German Army was already a serious problem AFTER THE POLISH CAMPAIGN in 1939. I for one would like to see some evidence for this unsupported statement. The alleged "serious problem" was not evident in 1940/41, I think.

I would not make this statement unless I could support it the 3 sources should be sufficient. T

German army expanded 20 fold in a 6 year period-1935-1941

“Such efforts notwithstanding the Heer experienced pre war growing pains. It had a severe and insurmountable ffficer shortage which reinforced the army traiditonal reliance on NCO’s. Yet the shortage in late 1930”s was even more acute. The Heer thus went to war in September 1939 underofficered, a situation that steadily worsened throughout the war”
Clash of Arms How the Allies won Normandy

Other sources

ROTATION -OF GENERAL OFFICERS -AND COMMAND DURATION.
GERMAN GENERAL OFFICER CASUALTIES IN WORLD WAR II -- HARBINGER FOR U.S. ARMY GENERAL OFFICER CASUALTIES IN AIRLAND BATTLE? Major French L. MacLean.

COMMAND CONTINUITY ON THE AIRLAND BATTLEFIELD LESSONS LEARNED,
NEWSLETTER NO. 88-1, CPT Michael Foncannon

Even late in the war the average training time for a German officer was 18 months. Pretty tough to fill those officer slots especially if the average German officer slot in the Heer was filled 9.2 times!!!

2. If you look at the underlying reasons for the German defeat at Stalingrad it was quite simple: Logistics. What about the development of a strategic position which allowed a long open flank guarded by allies of doubtful capability?

This is a tactical issue not covered by the research however I will do my best to answer the question since it is related to the issue above. Stalingrad was not the original target of the Operatio Blau but the oil fields were. Hitler changed his mind midway and decided that Stalingrad should be the main objective. The German manpower and logistic situation could only sustain 1 drive not both. There seems to be general agreement that German Army Groups A and B should have launched an envelopment of the city. There seems to be agreement among historians that had the Germans done this Stalingrad would have fallen much faster. To the Gates of Stalingrad: Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August 1942.-Colonel Glantz

As for the German allies they they gave a good account of themselves in most cases. However when 1.5 million Russians hit you with everything they got and your biggest tank gun is a 37mm-than I think this quote by US Infantry will do-If you don’t have any weapons that can stop a tank..Its not obsoloete..The German allies did not have the weapons to fight T-34/s and it was not obsolete!

What about Hitler's apparent obsession with Stalingrad?
This goes back to question2. It was not the original target of the drive until after the operation started. If Hitler wanted Stalingrad so badly he should have never divided the drives. The manpower was not there to do both and the logistics system was stretched to the limit. (When Titans Clashed)

What about the German policy towards the untermenschen? which built up such universal opposition...you use the term "underlying".

Again outside the scope of the research..however the partisan movement at times did have fairly serious effects on German operations. Kursk and Operation Bagration, diversion of manpower to form security divisions instead of infantry divisions.

What about the role in Stalingrad of leaders of great stature...Kruschev? Zhukov?
They won. The only question is why did it take so long for them to defeat a half supplied army in the first place. Kursk Northern Wing-1st week tank and artillery ammunition shortages, Kharkov August 1943- lack of artillery shells force the Germans to retreat because they did not have the manpower to hold the city and surrounding area with out huge amounts of artillery shells (of course the Russians cut the rail line but than again the Germans were unable to reroute the supplies so they abandoned Kharkov for the very last time because they did not have the necessary lift capacity (Decision in The Ukraine)

The T-34?
The list of strategic German intelligence failures is long. The biggest failure was one that any German high school student in 1940 with a half a functioning brain could have solved for the operation planners of Operation Barbarossa- Russia-Population 170+ million

Hitler gets a mention for 1940-1. That's all. Presumably he had no role in the structure of the Heer after that time.

Hitlers primary role was the expansion of the German army. He did not invent the Panzer division. Hitlers obession with numbers is why he divided the panzer divisions in 2 in 1941 for Operation Barbarossa-by accident he created a very fine and balanced formation but that was not his intention. If he could get over his obession with creating new divisions and putting the replacements back into the frontline divisions the manpower issues in the German army might better utilized but Hitler insisted on creating new division even in 1945 when the officer cadre to create such formations simple no longer existed. On Armor- Bruce I. Gudmundsson

enjoy :)