MC NATO national army doctrine design question

[JDR Dragoon]

Tactical problems:

The armored infantry battalion has a total of 15 combat platoons (if we count the aggregate surveillance section and security squad in the battalion HQ company as the equivalent of a platoon), while the armor battalion has 14.

Out of these, 3 platoons (6 in the armor battalion) can both move and fight under the protection of armor (the tanks in other words).

7 platoons (4 in the armor battalion) can move under the protection of armor, but not fight effectively mounted while under fire (M113 infantry, armored TOW platoon).

5 platoons (4 in the armor battalion) can neither move nor fight under he protection of armor (motorized infantry platoons, motorized TOW platoon, and the battalion reconnaisance and security assets).

-The tactical problems presented by the lack of armor is worst with regards to the TOWs, which are the battalions only long range AT assets. They must thus constantly change firing position in order to avoid suppression or destruction by enemy artillery. This is of course worst for the motorized TOWs, who are dependent on engineer support if they want to establish a permanent position (a ramp dug into the earth w. overhead cover provided by logs, where the vehicle can be parked to ride out the enemy artillery preperation)

-The motorized infantry is less of a problem in the armored infantry battalion, where most of the combat power consists of dismounted infantry anyway. Usually there would be some form of terrain in the battalion sector that could mitigate the lack of armor and allow concealed movement by the motorized infantry. It was a much greater problem to meaningfully employ it in the armor battalion, whose tactical missions usually consisted of mobile delaying/defense missions or outright (counter)attacks. This was eventually solved during the 1990s by exchanging the motorized infantry company for another tank company (thus raising the brigades total tank strenght from 40 to 50 in the process). Eventually the motorized infantry in the brigades ended up getting wheeled APCs. A stopgap solution would often be, that the armor battalion "picked up" the tank company of the mechanized inantry battalion whose area it was passing through in order to deliver its (counter)attack, thus raising the number of tanks from 20 to 30, but this is of course the tactical equivalent of robbing Peter to pay Paul.

-The range of the infantrys antitank weapons also presents a problem. Both the 84mm recoilless rifle and the 12.7mm HMG has an effective range against armor around 500 meters (and then only if the range has acuurately been measured for the 84mm RR, using some kind of rangefinder or rangecard/map). The M72 LAW is even worse (around 150 under realistic circumstances). When the danish army went shopping for its medium range AT weapon in the late 1970s, 3 systems were trialled: DRAGON; MILAN and the 84mm RR. DRAGON was thought deficient in range and accuracy (the finicky guidance system using rockets firing in sequence being a factor here), the more so when seen in relation to the weight and price of the system. MILAN was what the army wanted (range in excess of 1.5 kilometer, good hitting power, accurate and quite fast missile), but was also the most expensive. The 84mm RR eventually won, when it was able to consistently hit targets out to 800 meters during the trials (I have no idea how they did this, possibly the gunner ate his wheaties or the trials were rigged, it might also just have been dumb luck). In addition, this system was the cheapest to both initially purchase and to maintain in service. Later it was of course discovered that your average soldier, be he conscript or enlisted, couldn´t hit consistently out to 800 meters...

-The lack of armored reconnaisance assets also means, that the battalion, be it armor or armored infantry, will have to commit its main force units much more quickly in order to force the desired outcome, since the battalions reconnaisance assets cannot fight in any meaningful way and are checked by even the lightest resistance.

-While not really a weak point per se, the number and quality of night vision devices also leaves the battalions at about parity w. their WAPA counterparts: each squad has an IR/White Light projector and sight, with an effective range of around 250 meters (using IR or white light) or around 50-100 (using the IR sight in passive mode, relying on ambient IR light). The sight can be mounted on an assault rifle or on the tripod for the squads machinegun. There is no night sight for the 84mm RR. The platoon has a 60mm mortar for illumination and the company mortar section also has illumination rounds plus a supply of 84mm starshells for the 84mm RR, held at company level. In addition each company has a large IR/White Light projector, which will illuminate targets w. white or IR light out to around 750-800 meters. The tanks have light amplification to enable the driver and commander to see at night, while the gunner has an IR Sight and an IR/White Light projector (effective range of around 1000 meters in active mode. Perhaps around 100 in passive mode, depending on the prevalence of "natural" IR Light). The TOWs have no night sights and were relying on illumination provided by others. By the late 1980s most of the long range anti-armor weapons would have had Thermal Sights (TOWs, Centurion MBT, M41 Light Tank, w. the Leopard 1 scheduled for upgrade), while the infantry was left lacking ntill the mid-late 1990s before receiving modern light amplification weapon sights.

-The total number of MBTs in the brigade is also quite modest (40). This is not so great a problem in the forward deployed brigades, who would usually have defensive missions where infantry could carry much more of the fight. But the brigade in divisional reserve would usually have to execute some kind of counterattack or mobile defense in order to save/extricate the forward brigades. By the late 1980s this had been somewhat rectified by the addition of a so called Tank Destroyer Battalion to the reserve brigade, which added 50 worn out 20pdr armed Centurions to that brigade and brought the total number of MBTs here up to 90. It was planned, but never realized, to eventually equip this unit with Leopards. Instead, it got 105mm Centurions with thermal sights, LRF and computerized fire control. The engine and running gear wasn´t overhauled or changed, so they remained mechanically unreliable due to age, but could shoot very credibly and accurately at long range, although not while moving.