RE: Moscow '42 balance opinions thus far?
Thanks for the responses.
To be clear: I like the campaign's setup a lot, but just feel there are some balance issues. I don't think the work on it is "shoddy" at all.
Unless I missed it, no comment has yet been made on the motorized infantry being twice as fast as Soviet infantry even though they're operating in (deep) snow conditions.
I'm aware 2. Panzergruppe retreated a substantial distance, but eventually its line was torn apart, as can be seen at the start of the January campaign. The line will only be torn apart if the Soviets can assault the Germans or pin them.
As to German replacement rates: they're low, but the crucial thing to keep in mind is that you have time to refit them. A lower replacement rates just means it takes the Germans longer to recover strength, it doesn't stop them from actually recovering a substantial amount of strength. Take a look at 4. Armee, for example. If you'd run a campaign game until the point where it activates, you'll discover that many of its units are in fairly good shape after 7-8 days of refitting. Similarly, the Soviets in that sector are no longer depleted either. By the time Kalinin Front starts to get serious, 9. Armee will also have refitted to a significant extent, because the Soviet reinforcements only arrive after 2.5 weeks.
As to the Panzer divisions having obsolete tanks: most Soviet infantry units can't fire at them from 1 hex away and these are also the same tanks that made all those huge pockets earlier in the campaign. Mobility has a strength all of its own, and in this case that's more obvious than ever because if the Germans break through, their Panzer units can move several hexes per turn whilst the Soviet infantry can retreat only 1 hex per turn.
As to the Sukhinichi situation: it can't really be compared to the strategy I call into question, because in the case of the scenario, you're responding to a Soviet attack and have to rescue your troops from encirclement with a single understrength Panzer division.
The problem with a backhand blow is that the Germans decide when to launch it. The Soviets suddenly have to respond to the Germans, not the other way around, and they don't have a lot of means to do so.
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