Updated Normandy'44_Alt (third time, 13 AUG)

[Elxaime]

To take advantage of the current excitement over a new N44 approach, I wanted to raise the issue of different replacement rates for infantry replacements.

On the Allied side, my understanding of Normandy was that:

- the US generally was able to replace US infantry during the campaign (the big US replacement crisis would not fully hit until the heavy casualties of the early winter campaigns near the West Wall). So American infantry can be given a stable and steady replacement/recovery rate. An exception MIGHT be for the US Airborne and Ranger troops, which as elites may have drawn from different pools and had longer training times? I don't know the answer on this, although I know the Germans late war tended to throw anyone into a parachute smock and call them "airborne" I think the the US (and perhaps the similar Commonwealth and UK units) did not use such shortcuts during the Normandy campaign. The impact of lower replacement/recovery rates for Allied airborne would tend to encourage the cautious use of them after the initial landings, which would be historical.

- for the UK and Commonwealth, the picture would be different. Britain, having been at war for five years already, was at the end of its manpower rope. Montgomery was keenly aware of this and if he threatened to forget, Churchill was quick to remind him. To the extent any historical critique of Montgomery's general ship of the Second Army is valid, it must take into account the British knowledge that, once these highly trained men were gone, there weren't enough replacements to fully refill the ranks. Reducing UK infantry replacement rates could model this, and in game terms would reflect the different way losses were approached by the various allies at the stage of the war. As far as Canadians, I believe Canada still sustained an all volunteer force at this time (not sure). Perhaps they would be treated somewhat differently. Ditto for the French and Poles once they arrive.

On the German side:

- historical accounts seem to indicate that German infantry received few replacements once they reached Normandy. Units were bled white in place. Partly of course was the issue of the heavily-interdicted supply lines to Normandy making normal replenishment increasingly difficult. But the Soviets launched Operation Bagration a few weeks after Normandy and Germany was sustaining huge losses in so many theaters that it was running out of men. This problem would mitigate momentarily later, once the Allies and Soviets entered the Reich proper and Hitler called out his last-ditch forces, but was clearly an irreversible trend. I would assume SS units might be an exception, given the political determination by Hitler to give them precedence over the regular Wehrmacht. As the war entered its final months, this preference for the SS starved the regular Wehrmacht of men and equipment and tended to put the SS more into the action (with mixed results). Perhaps in Normandy this can be reflected by giving the SS infantry a slightly better replacement rate. As for the Ost units, I have to think they would have just wasted away - how many Hiwis and dragooned East Europeans did the Germans really have available by then anyway?

Just some thoughts on in infantry in Normandy, while we are on replacement rates. I think the impact of differentiating them will lead both sides to operate differently (and more historically). The Allied player, mindful of the lesser ability of the UK and Commonwealth to generate replacement infantry, will be inclined towards a bit more caution in their use. This will also mirror political factors, e.g. British reluctance to replay the positional carnage of WW1. The Germans will tend to want to use the SS more, since they have a better flow of replacements, which would also mirror Hitler's growing determination to make them the lead (admittedly this would not fully take shape until after the failed July assassination, but I think by this time Hitler was already headed this way).