(03-08-2015, 11:44 PM)ComradeP Wrote: It's a curious battle, Prokhorovka isn't the most interesting part of it in my opinion. Most of us seem to play pre-Prokhorovka scenarios as well and I'm very happy the game covers the majority of the interesting action (Gresnoye fills one of the largest remaining gaps) from the start of the offensive to the stalemate at Prokhorovka.
Aside from XXXXVIII Panzerkorps' poor performance, it remains strange that the Germans attacked across the Donets, which from a military perspective didn't serve much of a purpose.
Not only is the Panzerkorps attacking into terrain very unsuitable for mobile warfare with their backs to a major river, but it's also attacking away from the target of the penetration. Even if it had succeeded, even a small redeployment of Soviet forces from the greater Izyum area to the north would've made the flank of the Panzerkorps untenable. If the Panzerkorps would've attacked 3 abreast, possibly with a Panzer division in reserve with the Donets at their flank, that would have made German progress to the north much more likely.
It's all hindsight, but on paper I'm never sure how the Germans envisioned this operation would succeed with such a high chance that one or more of the Panzerkorps would quickly find itself unsupported with open flanks. It's a very different plan than most people would try in a wargame. The attack across the Donets was imaginative to a certain extent and might have caused confusion if the Soviets had not expected it, but considering all the delays in when the operation would be launched, it was pretty much guaranteed that it wouldn't go anywhere fast enough to help the SS in a way that couldn't be accomplished otherwise.
ComradeP,
I couldn't agree more with your analysis - it was strange to go across the Donets instead of using that to protect the right flank. I do believe that the road net to Kursk played a part in the decisions that were made ie. major roads and railways were near or adjacent to the river and would be easily disrupted by shelling if there wasn't some buffer zone on the East bank.
That said, there was room on the left flank to extend and a line abreast push would have made more sense.
There were a couple of other considerations; German Infantry Divisions were non-existent. Panzer Divisions were having to do what the Infantry should do, clearing fortifications and holding flanks. By it's nature the most powerful mechanized divisions had to be employed this way as the SS and Gross Deutschland had 6 PzGr battalions vs the more normal 4 of the Heer Panzer Divisions. This dispelled their strength quicker than almost anything and continued to put stress on manpower levels.
Secondly, with Barbarossa, Case Blau and Manstein's Backhand Blow the German's had confidence that they would quickly breakthrough the Soviet lines and shatter the defense. Many of these prior operations involved deep penetrations with little consideration for flanks and until Kursk the German's had been able to breach the toughest Soviet defenses and prevail. The distance of advance and the forces at their disposal was enough to convince the German's that they would be successful based on prior experience.
The German's wanted to initiate a strategic clash that would destroy the bulk of the Soviet's reserves - every indication was that Kursk was going to provide that. The main difference between the protagonists is that the German's though their attack was the main action, where as the Soviets viewed this as just act one in a bigger strategy. Painfully, Germany realised that they could not underestimate their opponent after Operation Citadel...
David