FWWC - Adjustment to number of turns

[jonnymacbrown]

I just wonder if any of the people calling for more turns to enhance the attack have ever played out a campaign to the finish? Seems to me all the calls for changes in structure are based upon theoretical analysis. How can you know that a Russian offensive into East Prussia won't work if you've never tried it? Just my opinion, jonny

[ComradeP]

A lot can be derived from how the mechanics work. If you know a certain value, like supply, and know how that works in practice, such as cutting Russian replacements and significantly increasing their chance of being Low Ammo in the case of Clash of Empires for East Prussia, you will have a good idea of what a side can do at a certain point.

When I conceded our Clash of Empires game, it was clear 2nd Army wasn't going much of anywhere as even though I had a local numerical superiority near where we were fighting at the time, lack of replacements and many units going Low Ammo each turn significantly cut down on my offensive capabilities. Wars of attrition tending to favour the Russians is in this case not going to happen due to their supply situation limiting supply to a handful of men each turn at best near where we were fighting.

I think turn numbers in Clash of Empires are fine, by the way, it's mostly France that can use some extra turns if the Marne is to be reached.

Something like how long it takes to get to a certain point, such as with my comments on the French being able to walk into the Ardennes unopposed in the Grand Campaign because their units are not Fixed (they do have release triggers, so maybe something was simply overlooked with the many changes in place), is a fairly simple matter of dividing movement cost in MP's by MP's per turn.

As an aside, the deployment of Ve Armée for the French is interesting, as it makes you wonder how Lanrezac got into his position west of Namur. The army essentially marched northwest, whereas it starts poised to move into the Ardennes. The army that walked towards disaster in the Ardennes was IV Armée. It's details like that which make looking at the map and initial deployment alone such a joy in these games, as it invites you to wonder why or how certain events transpired.

[jim pfleck]

Comrade P,
Going back to your comments on the potential for whole armies to meet disaster and the replacement rates contributing to preventing disaster, I have a few comments that I think can deepen that discussion.
-The destruction of the Russian 2nd Army was in a situation very different than in the West. The whole army was extremely isolated even before the Germans turned both of tis flanks. It was far from supply (and had poor supply to begin with), and no flank protection, and lacked the sort of road and rail network in its rear that was found (I think) in northern France and Belgium. Hindenburg and Ludendorff spent the rest of the war trying to duplicate it, more or less, and failed. The flip side of this is that the Germans, even when well supplied, could only pursue so fast...

-French armies were much better lead and organized at all leadership levels in 1914 than the Russian 2nd Army, and were more flexible. They were mostly fighting in their won country and had better rear command communication and, I think better air recon. So even when beaten badly they were able to maintain enough cohesion to retreat in decent order.

-So, as you say, a decent player will not lead a whole army to destruction. Well, yes, I agree. Just as the decent French generals did not either. In my EP campaign I lost about a corps of 1st Army to overextension (that total coming from 3 corps) before I was able to extract myself, and that was part of the learning curve of fragile morale and I was playing to win and being reckless (I tend to favor force security in all games because my brain does not deal well with an armored Blitz or Napoleonic cavalry). The possibility is still there for disaster, depending on how even a decent player decides to play.

-Finally, regarding replacements. I just finished about 140 turns of the 190 turn Ypres Campaign and my French and British reserves were at 100% strength (some of my front line troops were at 40% or below---I had been rotating within brigades and divisions and managed to keep an operational reserve of a about 3 French inf divisions and a British infantry and cavalry division). In several posts, I have seen you talk about replacements and numbers. When I play, I tend to focus on fatigue management more than numbers management. And also on maintaining the number of MG and artillery units (and trying to keep their numbers high too). Sure, a larger battalion causes more damage via fire, but a disordered unit, regardless of size, is very vulnerable to melee and weak on the defense. So I tend to be less concerned with the size of battalions than the numbers. If they are out of line long enough to regain a lot of strength I think that represents that your position is strong overall anyways.... What do you think?

Anyhow, I have played one EP game to conclusion as the Russians (minor defeat), 2 Race to the Sea to about 140 turns each (won major victory as each side), and 140 turns of a Ypres (major victory). I am currently about 30 turns in to Lodz. I have played a mix of skill and experience levels but none of my opponents are "horrible."

[ComradeP]

The destruction of 2nd Army was in my opinion just as much due to Russian failure at the operational level than to German success, so I agree that Russian leadership in 2nd Army on that level was worse than the French. However, as can be seen in the Tannenberg scenario, the actual disaster could have been avoided. The Russian center is either not or not heavily opposed. The left flank is the only flank in real trouble, the right flank can still pull back and the Germans have no quick means of pursuit.

It's a good example of the destruction of the enemy force because the enemy allowed it to happen through poor leadership.

This is one thing that Rennenkampf was sure to avoid, however, so Russian C&C wasn't entirely awful. If you look at the initial position of 1st Army in the northern part of East Prussia and the opposition it faced, it becomes more clear why Rennenkampf was so cautious. He's facing about 4.5 divisions with about 4.5 divisions, due to one division being weakened and other being spreadout, and one of his corps is nowhere near the front. After that became clear at Gumbinnen, I'd say the logical response would indeed have been for him to reorganize before advancing. His pace still being slow after all his forces were at the front was overcautious.

In France, the situations where the French could have lost an army were due to flaws on the strategic level. Even if the French were better on the operational level than the Russians, their initial offensives into the Ardennes and Germany ended in narrowly averted disaster, as can be seen in the Early campaign. Lanrezac not turning around, or the Crown Prince not launching a premature counterattack could have lead to situations where one or more armies were in grave danger. As with 2nd Army in East Prussia, that would've been a situation that could only occur if the enemy let the Germans have their chance, which in this case didn't happen.

The flank protection of the BEF also wasn't ideal, which is why there are a number of scenarios that cover the possibility of  parts or all of the BEF being overtaken as it retreats.

Regardless of the merits and flaws of the adjusted Schlieffen Plan, it was one of the best counters to the French strategy.

The reason this is difficult to replicate is that, aside from having far more information on the starting points/initial dispositions of the German forces, you are also likely to pull back when faced with a flanking attack. The French happily kept attacking towards Germany as the Germans flanked through Belgium. The lack of fast movement or the ability to "catch" a retreating foe that doesn't want to be caught combined with having so much information makes this one of the series that is likely to play out differently than the historical situation.

In that sense, it's the opposite of PzC where it can be too easy to crush defenders that are slower than you, particularly lower quality ones like the average Soviet Rifle Division, which can end up being gobbled up by the division after being encircled.

It comes down to it being really difficult to encircle or destroy a force moving at the same speed as your units, even when Disrupted. The possibility is indeed there for disaster, but it's not likely to happen at the scale it did in the war.

There is one important "but" in all this, namely that as casualties are likely to be higher in the game than in the war at least in France, it might still be possible to achieve a favourable loss ratio similar to destroying a corps or more. Aside from the moments where the Germans hold, the war in East Prussia ended up being a fairly peaceful affair for the part of it I played until I conceded near the halfway point due to it being a war of movement mostly.

As to replacements or fatigue being more important: generally speaking, I'd say fatigue management is indeed more important like you say on the long term. However, loss management can be more important on the short term for the simple reason that you replace more losses than fatigue per turn.

About twice as quickly at 70 or more supply (so the full rate) in daylight turns, with ~1000 Men units receiving roughly 30 men per turn and the fatigue recovery rate being 15. You could thus compensate for at least the firepower penalty fatigue gives through recovering losses. I'd say it's unlikely your men will go down to far below 70 in a full Early campaign game if at all, as even the Germans at the Marne are at ~65 local supply.

There is a difference between the methodical slaughter type scenarios like Ypres where you start with a frontline in place and the meeting engagement turning into methodical slaughter campaigns, so I agree with your comments on unit rotation in the Ypres campaign. In a full campaign, there might be the option of moving a fresh corps in, whereas in the Ypres campaign or set-piece scenarios you have to rotate units to maintain combat integrity. Overall, maintaining support weapon strength is probably more important than infantry strength on the long term, so the Russian "strategy" of sacrificing men to save guns can pay dividends in a full campaign. 

As an aside, I've been thinking about ways to make moving small units by rail less of a nightmare in terms of rail capacity used. Maybe MG and foot movement infantry type units with less than 200 or so men not using rail capacity might be an option just in FWWC.

Creating a spearhead of MG units, a potential way this could be abused, is countered because they'd still be out of command range and thus have a lower quality level. Besides, in theory the side with larger MG units can already do this. The transport system not taking size into account can lead to odd situations that a full Panzer regiment in PzC costs as much to move as a gun company, and that a 30 Men French MG unit uses 1 point just like a 1253 Men Zoave infantry battalion. Small units not using rail capacity would mostly help the French, as moving a French division around is a pain due to all those MG units. A French regular infantry division require 34 rail capacity, and a German regular infantry division 25 (if the pioniere unit is combinable) whilst German divisions are larger by about a battalion in terms of total manpower and having twice as many guns due to having a full cavalry regiment, more than 1 engineer company, larger infantry battalions, larger field gun units and divisional artillery.

[Volcano Man]

It comes down to it being really difficult to encircle or destroy a force moving at the same speed as your units, even when Disrupted. The possibility is indeed there for disaster, but it's not likely to happen at the scale it did in the war.

True, but I have to mention (and this is not criticism!) a current campaign I am in (F14 Grand Campaign A). The Belgians fought valiantly there, but were ultimately cut off by the German 1st and 2nd Armies and their field army was completely destroyed (although of course a similar disaster could befall the Germans later in the campaign and push the result in the other direction, though). This delayed the German advance by some days, but it also provided a plethora of VPs that helped put the Germans immediately reach a DRAW at this stage, and left Antwerp open. You figure that both of these things would have had long lasting effects on the war (imagine a Race-to-the-Sea situation where no Belgian Army is present), so I am happy with the effect on the campaign (VPs) and with the demonstration that you can actually round up and completely destroy a full army in about a day or two once you isolate it (which is encouraging to know that it wouldn't take weeks to do).

Of course the trick is always what both sides do. Will the sacrifice of time versus the sacrifice of forces be more important in our campaign, or vice versa? I guess we will see. Again, not a criticism on our allies but rather just a demonstration of what can happen in a campaign. In their defense, I am sure the plan was more about using the Belgians to hold and delay the Germans advance for days, then fall back - and they did this, but as is often the case, the delay stuck around too long and two HKKs swung in behind during that time. The Belgians nearly got away with French help but the Germans closed the escape route just in the nick of time. It was a good battle.

All too often though the historical and a-historical (here in these games) behavior directly depends on how much both sides cooperate. Often the historical is difficult to replicate, but you can just imagine that if the commander in these games did similar movements then it would be. As a designer, all I can really do is allow for the possibility to exist, and in some cases encourage it (for example, the French can attack into the Ardennes for a few days to try to get their early termination win), but I am very much against "on rails" effects (like having the Russian 2nd Army get withdrawn when they were historically destroyed -- no way). Still, I think the above situation with the Belgian Army does at least demonstrate that the elimination of a field army is indeed possible, at least, and this makes me happy to know what is possible.

As an aside, I've been thinking about ways to make moving small units by rail less of a nightmare in terms of rail capacity used. Maybe MG and foot movement infantry type units with less than 200 or so men not using rail capacity might be an option just in FWWC.

This is interesting, however no matter what is done it will result in gamey effects. The idea behind the rail capacity levels right now is that it is based on what historical forces were actually moved around, and that they often moved those forces in "hops", meaning they moved part of a unit down the line and, in a long journey, disembarked somewhere. Then they moved up the other part and continued. These MG units are part of the original capacity total, so they are already factored. On the other hand, someone certainly could say 'to hell with those small MG units' (as the French for example), and just move all the big infantry units first. Fine, but infantry without those MG sections really have trouble holding (I do know that "holding" usually means the MG sections is eliminated in the process, but at the very least the MG units help deny the Germans from taking the ground in the same assault, and help keep French casualties lower from direct fire in the time before they are eliminated). So, leaving the MGs behind does have a sacrifice (and these MG sections are sacrificial units in 1914).

Long story short: I don't see the diminished capacity from MG unit movement as a bad thing, as it was already factored and it comes with a pro/con situation if you want to leave them all behind. Also consider that MG units do have a larger footprint than infantry when in travel by rail, in that they often had horses, large quantities of ammunition (consolidated at brigade level, usually) and their actual MG and equipment. Of course a section of MGs would not be comparable to an infantry company of a thousand men, but an MG company certainly would be comparable.

Still, maybe only the smallest units of <= 30 men could ignore capacity, but not the 200 men units. I will have to think about that.  As you say though, I dislike the idea that the allies would theoretically be able to transport masses of MG units in advance, but doing so would come with a trade off of being out of command, having a quality level loss, and wouldn't necessarily be effective at doing anything by themselves, however, I have already seen opponents just pile in masses of MG sections into stacks with other divisions despite this. So I tend to lean towards this being a bad thing as it would allow some players to easily and repeatedly mass their MGs from other divisions by rail into one place, to act as a huge speedbump.

[ComradeP]

The 200 Men figure was a rough indication for company-sized Foot infantry units, but afterwards I realized that no such units exist as though there are smaller units (bicycle recon, sometimes engineer units), those are not foot infantry.

If the rail capacity was adjusted to take the larger Entente division size in terms of units it into account, that's fine. I assumed rail capacity was supposed to cover about a division in EP '14 and France '14, so you'd have to move a corps in "hops" like you and the Campaign/Designer Notes mention, but could still move a division around.

Placing MG units with units not belonging to their division is an efficient way to manipulate the assault system in the same way that splitting up units or piling small units into the hex is in Panzer Battles because all defenders need to be Disrupted before an assault can succeed, and casualties are not evenly distributed. On the other hand, if only the MG units are not Disrupted, they might evaporate during an assault as they'll take most of the losses. Moving those units in as speedbumps could indeed be another problem, also as you have a fairly large number of them in each division so the loss of 1 or 2 of the MG sections/platoons doesn't hurt as much as losing a 90 or 120 Men unit.

A forward Belgian defence is an interesting idea. The Belgian Field Army is quite large and one of the things I never really understood for both the 1914 and 1940 invasions is why larger parts of it were not deployed closer to the Meuse.  It may have been due to the faith in the forts at Liege and Namur, but historically the fort at Liege could be flanked fairly easily in 1914. It would seem unlikely that the German cavalry would've gotten anywhere without infantry support had an entire division be deployed north of Liege.

With the Plan Michel, the Entente has a realistic chance of reinforcing the Belgians before their Field Army folds under German pressure, so it could make for an interesting opening battle indeed.

[BigDuke66]

While the other points make an interesting discussion I go back to the original topic.
As I mentioned I don't mind that we have no dusk/dawn turns but the impression stays that I can't do enough per day in the early scenarios where the combat day should be much longer than what we now have. I know that there was already an adjustment to address this but I think it's simply not done by raising the movement points, if you would raise them further to fit better with the early scenarios you would likely open up problems with the late scenarios. That is why I brought up the topic of adjusting the number of turns per day by using PDTs that mirror the time that was available with the number of turns in a certain time of the year and not by a general request for more movement points. I understand that a campaign has to be manageable but I really don't see so much effect even in campaign scenarios by adding 1-2 turns a day.
I want to point out that just because the players would get more turns per day doesn't mean they would use them day by day to the max and so could end up with a performance that would lay beyond history. More turns per day would obviously mean less hours covered by the night turns and with that the fatigue recovery at night should be adjusted down. By this we would have a natural limitation of an overuse of the additional turns a day because the fatigue gained over these turns wouldn't be compensated in any way by the night turns, the opposite would be the case because you have more turns to gain fatigue but the 2 night turns would recover less what in the end would again lead to a natural limitation. Overall that would surely change the dynamics of the gameplay with units sometimes in the need for a break over the course of the day.

It seems natural that nobody sees a problem in the late scenarios because the 6 turns a day seem to give enough time if you take dusk & dawn and preparation before and after dusk & dawn into the calculation, but also because we don't see any big movements anymore where one could see the discrepancy building up over several days. With this there is also a lack of discrepancy that really stands out comparing early vs. late scenarios because if late looks OK there is not much to compare against when looking at the early scenarios.

What ComradeP said is very true, with supports weapons taking a lot time to get into position, a position that can easily be spoiled if the enemy simply drops back a hex, it's hard to bring in the full effect of what is at hand and it takes time. It feels more like grinding through the enemy instead of dealing him a real punch that makes him take up a new position. With 1 turn to move, 1 turn to get out of travel mode you can fire on the 3rd turn what limits the use to 2 times a day at best. Again something that is much more noticeable in the early scenario with a lot movement compared to later scenarios with a stiffening frontline. But I don't see the need to change the way support weapons take time to setup, just more turns would be nice in the earlier mobile phase of the game.