The Role of the Tank

[Soldier]

Hitler attacked Poland and France long before the African campaign took place, etc.
So it seems that the Brits learned about the German Blitzkrieg from the two German campaigns.. :-)

The Brits nor the Americans never waged a real Blitzkrieg type warfare in WWII. They took the rout of the old cautious approach, of applying even pressure along the entire front, at the same time, etc..
Their "failed" Market Garden was the closest think they've ever done to a Blitzkrieg type attack.. :-)
(My opinion, based on impressions from the entire western WWII campaign)

[Kelen]

Well Lt Colonel John Fuller was the first person to propose that tanks shouln't just be there to support the intantry and should be used basically as cavalry to punch a hole in the enemy and sweep into the rear areas, leaving the infanty to mop up. Although not totaly successful this plan was implimented at Cambrai, and again more successfully at Amiens, where both heavy and light tanks were used. The heavies to punch the hole and the light whippets to fan out into the rear areas and attack communications, HQ units and supply columns.

Basil Hart who rewrote the army's Infantry Training Manual in 1920 propsoed an 'expanding torrent' form of attack where resources should be used to exploit gains rather than fed into areas where difficulties were encountered. He wrote that success lay, "...partly in the tactical combination of tanks and aircraft, partly un the unexpectedness of the stroke in direction and time, but above all in the 'follow through' - the way that a breakthrough (the tactical penetration of the front) is exploited by a deep strategic penetration, carried out by armoured forces racing on ahead of the main army, and operating independantly."

These Germans used these tactics as the basis of Blitzkrieg, so I feel reasonably confident in saying that although they were indeed the first to use them on such a grand scale, they didn't come up with a 'unique' form of warfare, meremly 'borrowed' the ideas of others and refined them.

As for Market Garden, I wouldn't say that that was in anyway intended to be a Blitzkrieg. They couldn't bypass areas of resistance as they needed the whole length of the route secure. nor could the Armour range out in front of the infantry on it's own; and thirdly the intent wasn't to cut off or encircle units, nor to cause disruption behind the lines, but to achieve a specifc and limited tactical objective, i.e. to secure the crossings over the rivers.

[Soldier]

I stand corrected about Germany not inventing the Blitzkrieg.. :-)

However, in my second point. I did not mean to equate Marget Garden to the Blitzkrieg. Sorry for not making that absolutely clear.
Simply meant to say, that Marget Garden was the only daring and risky thing the Western Allies did, outside their "by the book war doctrine."
In which the tank's role was that of a support for the infantry..

Blitzkrieg took the tank a step further, by assigning it a knew role, besides..

[Kelen]

Fair enough :o)

[Saint Ruth]

In CM, a tank is just a mobile gun ;)
...enemy guns/inf/tanks fires on my inf and reveals their positions, and then my tanks blow them up...

Simple...

Strategically that's not what they're for, but CM isn't a strategic game...

[Fubar]

Some of the operations by the British 8th Army in North Africa always reminded me of a type of Blitzkrieg, large Armoured spearheads supported by infantry. Just wish i could replicate it in CM.:whis:

[Liebchen]

Marget Garden was the only daring and risky thing the Western Allies did, outside their "by the book war doctrine."
In which the tank's role was that of a support for the infantry..

;

Not to quibble, but some might consider D-Day to have been a daring and risky venture....

[Soldier]

I know where you coming from and agree.
I was simply speaking of the two different war doctrines.
I considered the german Blitzkrieg being new, bold and therefore somewhat risky.
Verses the status quo for the allies, fallowing their old cautious, safe approach to conducting war, etc..

[Zemke]

My Tanks primary role is to kill the enemy's Tanks and support my Infantry. What does that really mean, well it depends on what I am doing. If I am defending and I have tanks, then I can be pretty sure the Attacker will have more tanks than I, so I wait, and try to draw the enemy into coordinated "kill sacks" with AT guns and then I expose my tanks to help kill his tanks. Because I know that if I do not kill his tanks, my infantry are going to have a very hard time. So I guess you could say I am supporting my Infantry indirectly. Now if I have killed off his tanks, then I move to a more direct support sole for my infantry.

On the attack or Offensive, I use my tanks to overwatch my infantry, as they scout out woods and urban areas, looking for (a) Enemy Infantry, (b) AT guns......usually they find one or the other the hard way. If the Enemy then brings tanks into the fight, I try to use all means necessary to kill them, and the infantry fight is either on hold till the tank fight is finished, or they are directly supporting the tanks by close assault on the enemy tanks if they are close enough. Or if the enemy backs his tanks off, I continue the attack, never leaving my infantry unsupported.

Tanks are an enabler for your Infantry, they can make their life far easier, or enemy tanks can make it far harder, or impossible. Face it, they are pill boxs on tracks!

Bottom Line.........It is all situational dependent. To say "I use my Tanks this way everytime", is to ask for a loss, you have to be flexible.

[Zemke]

Well Lt Colonel John Fuller was the first person to propose that tanks shouldn't just be there to support the intantry and should be used basically as cavalry to punch a hole in the enemy and sweep into the rear areas, leaving the infanty to mop up. Although not totaly successful this plan was implimented at Cambrai, and again more successfully at Amiens, where both heavy and light tanks were used. The heavies to punch the hole and the light whippets to fan out into the rear areas and attack communications, HQ units and supply columns.

Basil Hart who rewrote the army's Infantry Training Manual in 1920 propsoed an 'expanding torrent' form of attack where resources should be used to exploit gains rather than fed into areas where difficulties were encountered. He wrote that success lay, "...partly in the tactical combination of tanks and aircraft, partly un the unexpectedness of the stroke in direction and time, but above all in the 'follow through' - the way that a breakthrough (the tactical penetration of the front) is exploited by a deep strategic penetration, carried out by armoured forces racing on ahead of the main army, and operating independantly."

These Germans used these tactics as the basis of Blitzkrieg, so I feel reasonably confident in saying that although they were indeed the first to use them on such a grand scale, they didn't come up with a 'unique' form of warfare, meremly 'borrowed' the ideas of others and refined them.

As for Market Garden, I wouldn't say that that was in anyway intended to be a Blitzkrieg. They couldn't bypass areas of resistance as they needed the whole length of the route secure. nor could the Armour range out in front of the infantry on it's own; and thirdly the intent wasn't to cut off or encircle units, nor to cause disruption behind the lines, but to achieve a specifc and limited tactical objective, i.e. to secure the crossings over the rivers.

All the above is true, except the "borrowed" idea part. During WW I both sides had been trying to solve the "Riddle of the Trenches". The Germans method was to create Stormtroopers, which were specially trained "Combined Arms Squads" (having flamethrowers, special hand grenades troops, and other trench clearing weapons). Their primary mission was to move as fast as possible deep into the enemy's trench network, bypassing centers of resistance, (sound familiar). Then follow on Infantry would eliminate the bypassed "pockets" of resistance, and continue to push forward. They did this through integration of Artillery and Infantry, and during the Offensive of 1918, use of close air support. They almost won WW I in 1918, but could not bring their artillery forward, nor get follow on Infantry forward fast enough. Also the forward troops could not be supported logistically over the shell shattered terrain and continue the "push". The Allies were able to shift forces to "shore up the breach", faster than the Germans could push more troops in, thus the Great 1918 Offensive failed.

Follow WW I the Chief of the German General Staff, Von Seeck instituted a systematic study of WW I, on every possible subject, by officers who had direct experience in each subject area. So lots of Captains, and not Generals, were solicited to write papers for the study. Following the studies, the Germans went about applying what was learned. Did other Officers of the Allies come to similar conclusions, yes, but their respective military institutions did not adopt those ideas. Fuller, Hart and De Gull were not taken seriously, or their respective military institutions were too rigid to accept the ideas of such relatively Junior officers. The great advantage the Germans had, was Von Seecks willingness to take the knowledge of the Officers who had fought in the trenches, and using a systematic study, apply that knowledge.

The term Blitzkrieg does not really explain what the Germans did in 1940. The term "Blitzkrieg" was coined by the English press. Although, according to the latest book on the subject, "The Blitzkrieg Legend, The 1940 Campaign in the West" by Karl-Heinz Frieser, 1995, the official German history of the 1940 campaign, the term was used in Official German doctrinal manuals, but only as a discription of what a Combined Arms Offensive would accomplish, which "Blitzkrieg" is nothing more than using combined arms with the mobility of tanks putting into practice what their infantry were doing in WW I, but on a larger scale. Larger only because the tanks allowed mobility, so depth was achieved, and that success could be supported logistically and with follow on forces. Last and most important, after the penetration, the mobility allowed the Germans to get inside the Allies decision cycle. The Allies (France and England) were making a decision based in information (A), while in reality was they should have been making decisions based upon information (D). So they were always reacting too late to the situation, and it got worse and worse, till the Allied Command and Control system totally failed, and there was no coordinated effort to stop the Germans.