F 14 Campaign scenario observations

[Volcano Man]

Well, no, I definitely won't be releasing everything earlier at start, there has to be some semblance of order in the beginning in my mind, sort of a guiding hand so to speak, in order to get the campaign started off on the "right foot". A good example is that releasing the BEF earlier before Mons would likely cause, with hindsight, the BEF to actually go on the offensive towards the Germans, so you end up with the other extreme being possible which is equally gamey in my view because of the circumstances (hindsight). But this is just my personal design philosophy.

The great news is, no one has to agree with me; anyone can make their own campaign adjustments with no fixed units if they want, so that it turns into total-full-hindsight-chaos from the start or they can do everything I described already and more for more controlled start if they prefer that -- it is certainly up to everyone to decide where to go from here, and that is a good thing! One thing I would like to see someone consider doing is taking the campaign and making some Strategy Operation starting deployments with a few choices for both sides to keep each other guessing, I think that would be great to remove some of the hindsight, but it would certainly be tricky to pull off.

But other than that, I guess my point earlier is that I *may* or *may not* make a few official changes like I suggested over time to keep the Germans "honest" at start, to deter them from being able to move everything west because I do consider it a bit gamey for various reasons. I do play the game and its campaign myself, and I was just throwing out a likely possibility on how I might deter such a blatant a-historical move in the future if it turns out to be one of those "magic opening moves" (think of the old "attack west" approach from the southern pincer in K43 campaign). I am very big on trying to guide opening moves to a point, then letting it go from there to encourage a historical starting point and flow of events, and many times you can't catch every starting case until you notice them out over time. Oh well, I guess that is all I can really say about it, carry on with the discussion (I don't want to obstruct it too much). :cheeky:

*edited: clarification*

[KG_RangerBooBoo]

Does the engine allow the release of the BEF if the Germans were to reach a geographical point at a certain date and time?

[FM WarB]

It seems to me that to get a historical start, the initial setup in the short campaign game enforces all the french mistakes. They will, as historically take it on the chin (or a more sensitive anatomical region) along the Sambre and in the Ardennes. The Germans, on the other hand are not compelled to make their historical mistakes besides whatever one might argue was wrong with the historical distribution of forces.

[Volcano Man]

Does the engine allow the release of the BEF if the Germans were to reach a geographical point at a certain date and time?

Unfortunately, this cannot be done unless some of the BEF units are placed out west to cause a triggered release by geographic location (when LOS is established to an enemy unit). Unfortunately, they need all their units on the canal, not to mention it wouldn't be historical to put some of their units way out west. However, this is not needed anyway with a good application of removable congestion markers (which is what I am looking into).

As FM WarB said, the allies are committed to their Plan XVII mistake and must take it on the chin and then go from there, that is true. However, it is untrue to say that the Germans too are not committed to their own mistakes at start -- their right wing is not reinforced with all the Ersatz divisions nor the XX.AK and XVII.AK as the Schlieffen Plan 1904 called for: the latter two AKs are "in the east" and the Ersatz divisions are all located around Nancy all because of von Moltke's tinkering of the plan. So, the Germans are just as much committed as the French, although it is true that on turn one they can do whatever they want. This is of course why they must be gently discouraged from a wholesale westerly migration on turn one.

(BTW, the XX and XVII.AKs are included in the OOB if anyone wants to make a Schlieffen Plan 1904 variant campaign of their own. Of course convincing an allied human opponent to play it would be kind of difficult!) ;)

[FM WarB]

(BTW, the XX and XVII.AKs are included in the OOB if anyone wants to make a Schlieffen Plan 1904 variant campaign of their own. Of course convincing an allied human opponent to play it would be kind of difficult!) ;)

Another idea is simply not to withdraw the two Corps from the right flank for the Eastern Front. (Ludendorf did not request them.) The improved Russian mobilization capability made the stationing of three regular and one reserve Corps plus some Landwehr pn East Prussia a bare minimum, I should think.

[Nitram Draw]

Does the engine allow the release of the BEF if the Germans were to reach a geographical point at a certain date and time?

Unfortunately, this cannot be done unless some of the BEF units are placed out west to cause a triggered release by geographic location (when LOS is established to an enemy unit). Unfortunately, they need all their units on the canal, not to mention it wouldn't be historical to put some of their units way out west. However, this is not needed anyway with a good application of removable congestion markers (which is what I am looking into).

As FM WarB said, the allies are committed to their Plan XVII mistake and must take it on the chin and then go from there, that is true. However, it is untrue to say that the Germans too are not committed to their own mistakes at start -- their right wing is not reinforced with all the Ersatz divisions nor the XX.AK and XVII.AK as the Schlieffen Plan 1904 called for: the latter two AKs are "in the east" and the Ersatz divisions are all located around Nancy all because of von Moltke's tinkering of the plan. So, the Germans are just as much committed as the French, although it is true that on turn one they can do whatever they want. This is of course why they must be gently discouraged from a wholesale westerly migration on turn one.

(BTW, the XX and XVII.AKs are included in the OOB if anyone wants to make a Schlieffen Plan 1904 variant campaign of their own. Of course convincing an allied human opponent to play it would be kind of difficult!) ;)

Can you link the BEF release to one of the French units out west?

[jonnymacbrown]

"Well, no, I definitely won't be releasing everything earlier at start, there has to be some semblance of order in the beginning in my mind, sort of a guiding hand so to speak, in order to get the campaign started off on the "right foot". A good example is that releasing the BEF earlier before Mons would likely cause, with hindsight, the BEF to actually go on the offensive towards the Germans, so you end up with the other extreme being possible which is equally gamey in my view because of the circumstances (hindsight). But this is just my personal design philosophy."

Any BEF commander who would leave that practically impregnable position @ Mons to go on the offensive to attack German 1st Army would have to be a candidate for the loony bin. Ed, you have to allow a player there to be an idiot. However, because the odd fool might launch a doomed offensive with the BEF shouldn't mean that everyone else be stuck there when we might need some room to maneuver tactically to protect the left. I can't understand why the BEF is fixed since nobody in full grasp of their senses would want to move it, as a premature move backward would expose the entire French position. :soap: Jonny

[Volcano Man]

Another idea is simply not to withdraw the two Corps from the right flank for the Eastern Front. (Ludendorf did not request them.) The improved Russian mobilization capability made the stationing of three regular and one reserve Corps plus some Landwehr pn East Prussia a bare minimum, I should think.

Yes, good point, that is another idea for a "what if" campaign variant.

Von Moltke took it upon himself to send even more troops to the east, which turned out to be a very bad decision to say the least. In his defense, things were looking quite grim in the east when he made the decision to send those additional forces that way (he simply lost his nerve), but by the time they arrive the Russian 2nd Army was already destroyed and, although they participated in the fight against the Russian 1st Army, they were probably overkill at that point.

---

Any BEF commander who would leave that practically impregnable position @ Mons to go on the offensive to attack German 1st Army would have to be a candidate for the loony bin. Ed, you have to allow a player there to be an idiot.

Well, I don't believe you are seeing the whole picture here, which is probably my fault for the very broad reply I made earlier about the BEF "being able to counter attack". I do not mean that the BEF would launch an all out offensive to the north as that would be quite foolish as you say. What I meant was, if the BEF was released early on then it would certainly not commit itself (human or AI) piecemeal to any German attack that develops on a historical basis against them, they would simply rush EVERYTHING to the canal bank and hold, thus making it utterly impossible for the Germans to make the slightest impression on them there. If it was left completely up in the air with no fixed units then the German migrant move to the west would be the ONLY viable option. So essentially, the BEF's fixed status is largely to the German's benefit of making a historical attack against them while they are committed piecemeal, thereby allowing the Germans to bloody them a bit at start (our neighborhood Mons vets can show you how to bloody the BEF there).

But, to prevent this from devolving into a discussion on what everyone feels is a necessary change to the stock campaign, I will make this final clarification:

I did not mean to imply that the Germans would or should not be able to go west IF I make any changes in the first update. I think it is a perfectly valid choice for the Germans to be able to do this and I don't mean to say that "moving west" is gamey. The choice itself is not gamey, the Germans intended to advance as far west as possible after all, and the only sure way they can actually get the BEF to keep withdrawing is by constantly threatening their flank (this is all historical). What I do consider gamey is IF the Germans are able to dance around the BEF in such a way that they can transplant the entire 1.Armee behind them in full force before they are released. IF that is the case, and this has yet to be proven, then some minor changes are in order for me to correct it, plain and simple. But again, absolutely nothing has been proven in this regard yet.

As it stands, the choice by the German commander to move around the BEF does come with known consequences, so that is a good thing. To me, as long as there is a pro / con relationship to the a-historical choice at start then it promotes a good situation. As it currently stands, if the Germans decide to "go west" immediately then:

*The BEF remains untouched and at full strength to cause serious trouble once they do get released

*The Germans spend valuable time moving west

*A huge gap forms between 1.Armee and 2.Armee, which is what the allies want to encourage at all times

*Any western move by the 2.Armee to cover the forming gap means that the French 5e Armee will not be pressed very hard (which is bad), and if need be they can send this army's arriving 18e CA to the west

*The allies have ample amount of stuff to send west to delay the Germans: the BEF 2nd, 3rd, 5th Cavalry Brigades, French Corps de Cavalerie (which did in fact move that direction almost immediately)

So, again, I am not looking at tying the German's hands on being able to move west, I haven't even made a single change. I am merely keeping an open mind on the possibility of adding a few more restrictions to prevent the gamey behavior described above, because just taking off the gloves and releasing the BEF earlier is not the way to go. Have no fear, other than me adding in a few congestion markers and possibly breaking a rail line here and there, I will not be doing any *drastic changes* to the campaign; I leave the drastic changes in the community's capable hands to make their own special variants.

Anyway, I just wanted to dispel any fears I might have inadvertently caused in my excitement to discuss the campaign. Perhaps I should not have said anything to begin with, but I was just excited to discuss it. :eek1:

[Mafooo]

I'm playing as the Allies in a PBEM.

I have no problem with the 1st Arm doing an end run. This isn't Panzer Campaigns where you can send out armored spearheads and strike deep into the rear. This is an infantry army that would have to slog it's way through the desert, effectively taking it out of the battle. I'm going to be falling back anyway, so not being molested by 1st Arm as I withdraw makes it even easier...especially since I will be falling back on my supplies.

Also, I hope their are no design changes on this. I would like to see people play this deeper into the game before making any design changes to the scenarios. ie we are playtesting so to speak so let's see what happens first...

[Ricky B]

From Jonny's test, and some tests I have run and running another now, Ed is fairly convinced he doesn't need to do much on this and will definitely wait for more input before doing anything. I suggested taking out a rail hex or 2 around the right wing, to prevent a dash across the river at Tournai, as I did that I got a few units across before the French blocked the rail line, but that didn't help much.

Best I can tell, the German infantry won't be across the river there until the very end of day 2, which then puts the British releasing in the morning and no real risk to their rear, and as he has mentioned a flank threat is historical, whether from the entire army or lesser forces. That is Ed's only concern, that the Brits not be cut off early on.

I think the push for the hole is a very valid strategy, what I have always wondered is why both sides were so concerned with the inner flanks between armies, when in all prior wars the armies always fought with open flanks between them and their neighbors. Obviously, by this time most armies had decided that gaps were a big negative, so a test to see how effective it might be sounds excellent.

Rick