Well, as promised:
The Background:
The danish infantry division of the late 1950s was built like a pre-Pentomic US Infantry Division: 1 Divisional tank battalion (3x14 Centurions plus some extras at battalion) 1 motorized infantry battalion (who was supposed to work w. the tanks, had trucks inityially but later halftracks and wheeled APCs of WW2 vintage) plus 9 infantry battalions in 3 regiments (leg units, but w. motor transport for the heavy stuff). The army had 3 divisions (2 in Jutland, one one Zealand) plus two extra tank battalions at corps level (one in the Western Corps in Jutland, 1 in the Eastern Corps on Zealand and adjacent islands). This accounts for all of the 216 MDAP Centurions (5x3x14=210 + and 1 extra tank in each BTN HQ=215).
By the early 1960s, most NATO countries were switching to the Brigade as the new standard combat unit. In addition there was a trend towards rising motorization and even mechanization. The danish army followed suit and broke down its divisions into brigades (but retained the division as a C2 hub for the units in Jutland, who were supposed to fight in conjunction). There were now 6 brigades, 3 in Jutland (The Jutland Division) and 3 on Zealand (1-3. Zealand Brigade), each w. 3 MOTINF Btns of 4 Inf Coys each, plus a Tank Btn (3x14 Centurions plus a mechanized Inf company in HTs/wheeled APcC). 1 of these brigades would be standing and fully manned w. trained conscripts (14 month service at that point) and enlisted men, while the other two brigades would be manned by reservists (but in the 1960s refresher training was generally yearly for the non commissioned personnel and several times a year for the officers, so even the reserve units had credibility). The problem was, that there wasn´t enough tank battalions (5) for each brigade to get one. So the 3rd Zealand Brigade remained a pure MotInf brigade. In addition there was the problem of the tanks. Back then, Infantry and Armor were different branches of service. So you had doctrinal squabbles about just HOW to utilize the brigades lone Armor Btn. Needless to say, the Motinf Btn commanders wanted it doled out, while the Armor branch offier in charge of the Btn wanted to retain his precious tanks concentrated. Often the brigade commanders choise in this matter depended upon his own branch of service as well (armor branch types tended to keep the tanks in a "fist", while the infantry types typically spread them).
In addition, the army was busy using its budget to mechanize its forces, buying a fleet of M113s for the infantry and M109s for the artillery in the US during the 60s, so the the rest of the army could actually follow the tanks and move under fire instead of growelling in the dirt, so no more tanks were forthcoming in the near future.
In the end, the solution was a bit solomonic:
-Armor and Infantry branch schools were dissolved around 1970s. Instead, a new "all arms" school was formed. Of course, officers going to command an infantry company was not sent on a course to become tank commanders and vice versa, but there was at least a tendency towards emphasizing all arms in the training of the officers and a company level officer was expected to be able to freely switch between commanding infantry and tank units.
-In addition a new brigade and battalion structure was thought up, using all those new, shiny M113s and M109s. The idea was to have "mixed" battalion combat teams as a standard and thus retain all-arms coordination at all times, instead of having to haggle back and forth about just how many tank companies the Armor Btn. should lend to the infantry units. It was also hoped, that a synenergenistic effect could be achieved with the change in the officer education: In the future a battalon commander would lead a mixed armor infantry unit per default, only it would either be an infantry heavy or an armor heavy battalion battlegroup.
In the late 1960s early 1970s, the brigade looked like thus:
-Armor btn (2xTank coy, 1x Mechinf in M113, 1xMotInf)
-Mechinf Btn (2xMechinf coy in M113, 1 xTank coy, 1xMotinf Coy)
-Motinf Btn (4xMotinf Coy).
The problem here was, that in order to raise enough tanks for an armor battalion for the 6th brigade (3rd Zealand brig.), the number of tanks in each company had to be scaled back to ten. Each brigade thus had a total of 20-40 tanks, since the MotInf Btn was gradually replaced with another MechInf Btn, as M113 purchases allowed. In addition, the Centurion tanks were not as spry as they were 15 years ago, and it was necessary to build up a central reserve at the armys combat school for the use (and abuse) of the students there and as a general attrition reserve.
Then the 1970s rolled around.
-A NATO decision meant, that reserve units were no longer counted as "Main Force Units". Only units manned and ready in peacetime now counted (by this method of accounting, the danish army had a princely total of 2 brigades ready, plus some extra standing battalions here and there).
-In addition, the effects of 1968 was now beginning to make itself felt. Conscientious objectors were on the rise, and the military wasn´t as popular as it used to be among young men.
The danish army thought out of the loop for a change and tried to kill two birds w. one stone with the defence plan of 1973:
-All armor, armored infantry units, armored artillery units, signals, Arm. Engineer and EW units were henceforth to be manned by volunteer enlisted men serving on running contracts. All 6 brigades were activated in peacetime and were manned at 66%. Thus the number of brigades (for NATO accounting putposes) suddenly climbed. This was achieved by having the Armor companies, the Arm Inf companies and part of the brigade support (like the TOW equipped anti armor company and the two SP batteries of the brigade artillery battalion) being manned by enlitsed personalle. Upon mobilization, this was supposed to be enhanced by additional conscript MotInf companies and towed artillery units joining the respective battalions.
-Conscript time was cut to 9 months in order to appease the 1968´ers, but these conscripts were mainly meant to be a supplement to the enlisted men.
This raised several problems:
-In order to attract the large number of enlisted men now needed to fill out the large number of Tank Companies, Arm. Inf. Companies, SP Artillery units and signal + EW units, the army was forced into a competetion w. the civilian job market. So the army tried to make service attractive by offering prospective contract signers terms of service as favorable as the ones found on the civilian job market. Needless to say this caused trouble for the standard of training in the units, since enlisted men would often be missing due to them being on leave (overtime pay being paid by just letting them take leave of absence) or being absent due to non-military matters (like taking time off to get the army-funded education that was a part of the enticement that got them to enlist).
-In addition, the lowering of the conscription period meant, that the amount of training became critically low. The experience of the danish army (and the US Army as well) in the post WW2 environment had been, that at least 12 months of no-nonsense service was needed in order to turn out adequately trained soldiers. 9 months was definitely scraping it (this was known at the time, but since the army was banking on their experiment w. standing units manned by enlisted personnel turning out a succes, the problems were handwaved away).
-In addition, there was not enough funding to man a 6th brigade with enlisted personnel. The number of brigades were thus cut from 6 to 5 (3rd Zealand brigade, the armys "problem child" since the early 1960s being the one to get the cut). This of course created other problems, which are not, at the moment, germane (DF85 doesn´t have the danish islands east of Jutland present as of yet).
The good thing to come out of the 1970s were:
-The army bought enough M113 APCs to fill out all of the 5 standing brigades.
-The army bought Leopard 1A3 MBTs (120) for the 3 Jutland Brigades, thus freeing up a similar number of now decidedly worn out Centurions.
The early 1980s brought more bad news:
-Actually manning all of these units w. enlisted men on contracts proved a problem. The more technically minded professions like EW and Signals were generally filled (both because the skills taught here were applicable to the civilian job market, but also because you could recruit women for these non-combat units as well, thus alleviating the recruitment crunch). The tank units were also less of a problem, but the armored artillery, infantry and engineer units were struggling in order to attract enough volunteers.
-The above, coupled w. a crisis of funding meant, that some armor units (mostly those in the Mech. Inf Btns) were mothballed and became reserve units. In addition, some of the armored infantry companies were now manned by 9 month conscripts, but the additional strain of mastering the use of the M113 in conjunction w. other forces in just 9 months was clearly too much.
By 1985 it was clear, that the experiment w. using enlisted men on contracts had partially failed. Starting in 1986, the army went back to 12 month conscription for combat engineers and armored infantry. Armor units and EW units (and to a degree signals) continued to be manned by enlisted men. At this point, the "spirit of 1968" had mostly gone away, so this was accepted by the conscriptable parts of the population with little fuzz.
The above is meant to elucidate some more on this old thread:
https://www.theblitz.club/message_boards...?tid=48741
At a later point: How was the 1970-80s vintage armored infantry brigade supposed to work.
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MC NATO national army doctrine design question
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