Japan 46 Campaign Supply Sources

[Elxaime]

Quick question on the Operation Coronet scenario for Japan 46.  

Playing Japanese side, I've noticed that for the main campaign (600 plus turns) there are no Japanese supply sources in the Boso Peninsula area and thereabouts southeast of Tokyo Bay.  This means that once the peninsula is cut off from Japanese map edge supply sources, any Japanese units there are isolated.  The same is true for the Miura Peninsula on the other side to the southwest of Tokyo Bay (although I don't believe that area is modeled as being Japanese-held in the late campaign like Boso is).  

However in the later campaign scenario, which models some last ditch Japanese units holding the Boso Peninsula, the Japanese have a supply source down there (and hence are not isolated).

Is this inconsistency intended?  It has a significant impact on Japanese strategy in the main campaign if there are no supply sources beyond the map edge ones.

Many thanks in advance.

[Strela]

Thanks, great points, we will have a look...

David

[ComradeP]

I noticed that as well, and was wondering why you were not starting to wheel the 147th clockwise to make sure it could retreat.

The Japanese also have a few island supply sources and a supply source in Tokyo, but there is an inconsistency between the Coronet campaign and the scenarios with a later start date featuring fighting on the peninsulas.

As to whether it has a big impact on Japanese strategy: I'm not entirely sure about that.

There's not much strategic benefit to be gained from holding any peninsula. You can either a) Lose control of the objective hexes at some point or b) Lose control of the objective hexes at some point, and lose any units holding the area.

The main campaign scenario is too long to allow the Japanese to defend any peninsulas, the Allies have plenty of time to capture them with limited forces.

[Elxaime]

I noticed that as well, and was wondering why you were not starting to wheel the 147th clockwise to make sure it could retreat.

The Japanese also have a few island supply sources and a supply source in Tokyo, but there is an inconsistency between the Coronet campaign and the scenarios with a later start date featuring fighting on the peninsulas.

As to whether it has a big impact on Japanese strategy: I'm not entirely sure about that.

There's not much strategic benefit to be gained from holding any peninsula. You can either a) Lose control of the objective hexes at some point or b) Lose control of the objective hexes at some point, and lose any units holding the area.

The main campaign scenario is too long to allow the Japanese to defend any peninsulas, the Allies have plenty of time to capture them with limited forces.

Yes, agree completely the peninsulas cannot be held, with or without supply, although certainly they can be held longer with supplied units.  I think though that if you know from the start there is no supply, then from the first turns you plan for evacuating those areas completely.  

I think an issue here is whether the Japanese planned historically to defend every inch, including the peninsulas.  Even though by this hypothetical time of the war, Japan would likely be in dire straights on food production and transport, would they have abandoned large areas to pull back?  This is logical, but as we have seen from Stalingrad and other examples, logic doesn't always rule military decisions.

If the designers decide the Japanese should only have map edge supply, they may need to tweak the VP levels, since the automatic assumption is the Japanese will abandon any areas likely to get cut off from map edge supplies.  I think this actually makes things harder for the Allies, since Japan will start pulling back immediately.

Not wanting to give anything away, I had a purpose for hanging on a while yet, although that purpose may be fanciful as the US seems to be breaking through!

[Secret45]

I am currently also playing this Campaign as well as the Japanese and also realized the odd supply situation regarding the mentioned area. Checked it for smaller Scenarios and Scenarios taking place later into the timeline featuring them and there they indeed do have smaller supply sources what irritated me a bit. From the designer notes I was also assuming that holding the penninsulas as long as possible is one of the important tasks for me.

Although I agree with ComradeP that they are most likely unholdable for the entire campaign, I think it is still a good option to defend them despite this fact. Don't want to go in to too much detail since I am at the moment playing this campaign and my opponent is also in the forums and might read this but I think the many fortifications and coastal and normal artillery batteries on them can seriously delay or even prevent the American player from using his navy during later stages of the campaign until he cleared the discussed areas. Defending there could even slow the entire advance down if he doesn't want to do it without being supported by his ships.

So not having any supply there really mitigates the advantages of this strategy making it way less effective then it would be with even smaller supply sources there. Seeing Tokyo and some islands having supply I  don't thinkt it would be unreasonable having supply sources over there as well.

[Elxaime]

I am currently also playing this Campaign as well as the Japanese and also realized the odd supply situation regarding the mentioned area. Checked it for smaller Scenarios and Scenarios taking place later into the timeline featuring them and there they indeed do have smaller supply sources what irritated me a bit. From the designer notes I was also assuming that holding the penninsulas as long as possible is one of the important tasks for me.

Although I agree with ComradeP that they are most likely unholdable for the entire campaign, I think it is still a good option to defend them despite this fact. Don't want to go in to too much detail since I am at the moment playing this campaign and my opponent is also in the forums and might read this but I think the many fortifications and coastal and normal artillery batteries on them can seriously delay or even prevent the American player from using his navy during later stages of the campaign until he cleared the discussed areas. Defending there could even slow the entire advance down if he doesn't want to do it without being supported by his ships.

So not having any supply there really mitigates the advantages of this strategy making it way less effective then it would be with even smaller supply sources there. Seeing Tokyo and some islands having supply I  don't thinkt it would be unreasonable having supply sources over there as well.

As another aside, it would be interesting to hear the designer's intent with the Japanese minefields blocking access to Tokyo Bay.  Low visibility means the Allied minesweepers can clear them easily and without loss - they were cleared rather early in the game I am playing Japanese in.  Contrast with the river minefields in Serbia 14', which were a real factor that needed some effort and thought to address.  

I think the two issues are linked in a way.  Although this is a hypothetical campaign, I assume if it had taken place for real the Japanese would have an incentive to hold the two coastal areas on either side of the Tokyo Bay entrance.  Right now, at least in the campaign, the incentives are the opposite - no ability to do so, since no local supply once the routes to the map edges are cut, plus there doesn't seem to be any impact on the Allied navies even if you held the coastal areas (aside from delay to Allied land forces) since the Tokyo Bay entrance minefields are cleared whether you do or don't.

[Strela]

Hi all,

We are looking at these for the upcoming patches. Please feel free to post any other observations.

David

[Elxaime]

Hi all,

We are looking at these for the upcoming patches. Please feel free to post any other observations.

David

Thanks.  Regarding entering Tokyo Bay, some added thoughts:

- It may be the Allied fleet, and its accompanying air support, are simply too powerful for any combination of Japanese coastal guns or mines to prevent them access to Tokyo Bay.  In 1915, for example, the Allies simply considered using naval power to force the Dardanelles, and some historians believe they almost succeeded.  In that case, maybe it should be easy to remove the mines and operate in the bay;

- If the designers think Allied doctrine, at the least, would mean they would want to clear the coasts on either side of the entrance, then that is another issue.  By 1946, keeping Allied casualties low would have been an even bigger domestic political issue than the year before, and even though stay-behind Japanese coastal guns may not have been as big a threat to Allied armored war vessels, it would have hampered softer vessels using water routes to resupply the troops as they advanced.  Not to mention opportunistic shelling of the invasion beaches.  So that may be a countervailing reason to create a special rule for needing to take the bay entrances;

- one design I found interesting from the Japan 45' game was the modeling of Japanese kamikaze air attacks and suicide ships and other special operations as an attrition factor on the Allied navies.  I have wondered why Allied fleet attrition represented in Japan 45' is missing from Japan 46'.  It might create an interesting dynamic if such attrition (perhaps at a lower percentage chance) is put into the game unless/until the objectives on both sides of the bay entrance are cleared.  This would create a real incentive for the Allies to take those areas (and stop the attrition) and likewise a real reason for the Japanese to hold them.

[Elxaime]

Hi again -

Since this as a thread that has been commented on by folks who may possibly be doing the next patch of Japan 46', I'd like to flag another possible issue.

JAPANESE DIVISIONAL MORTARS CANNOT FIRE INDIRECT BECAUSE NO ONE CAN SPOT FOR THEM
The Japanese divisional mortar units in 201st and 202nd Divisions may have been placed improperly in their divisional chains of command. I have noted for example that, even when mortar companies from from the 201st have otherwise eligible targets spotted by units of the 201st Division, they are treated as unspotted (and hence can't be targeted by indirect fire). This turns the mortars basically into direct fire weapons, which they are not. The culprit may be that the mortars are created as part of their own mortar regiment. Or some other issue. Those familiar with doing OOB realize how easy it is to create such spotting issues through small errors.

Hope this is also something that can be added to the to-do list for Japan 46' along with resolving the above-mentioned supply location questions.

Thanks!

[Strela]

Hi again -

Since this as a thread that has been commented on by folks who may possibly be doing the next patch of Japan 46', I'd like to flag another possible issue.

JAPANESE DIVISIONAL MORTARS CANNOT FIRE INDIRECT BECAUSE NO ONE CAN SPOT FOR THEM
The Japanese divisional mortar units in 201st and 202nd Divisions may have been placed improperly in their divisional chains of command.  I have noted for example that, even when mortar companies from from the 201st have otherwise eligible targets spotted by units of the 201st Division, they are treated as unspotted (and hence can't be targeted by indirect fire).  This turns the mortars basically into direct fire weapons, which they are not.  The culprit may be that the mortars are created as part of their own mortar regiment.  Or some other issue.  Those familiar with doing OOB realize how easy it is to create such spotting issues through small errors.

Hope this is also something that can be added to the to-do list for Japan 46' along with resolving the above-mentioned supply location questions.

Thanks!

Thank you Elaine, I will definitely correct this.

David