9 May 62, Farmington, Ms - Battleground 4: Shiloh

9 May 1862, Farmington, Ms [Curt Cabbage]

Little has been written about the post-Shiloh Union advance on
Corinth, Mississippi until now. With the release of Timothy B.
Smith’s volume on this campaign; Corinth 1862: Siege, Battle,
Occupation this has been brought to an end.. Once thought to
be an overly cautious, glacially paced period of inaction this
period has been brought to life. Included in this new work is
a description of the small battle near Farmington, Mississippi
that caught my attention. The seemingly insignificant affair
had consequences far beyond the short fight and led to a lost
Confederate opportunity. As a wary MG Henry Halleck inched his
way forward with his Union host comprised of MG John Pope’s Army
of the Mississippi, MG George Thomas’ Army of the Tennessee,
and MG Don Carlos Buell’s Army of the Ohio the Confederate leader
faced a difficult choice. In the important railroad junction
town of Corinth MG P.G.T. Beauregard realized to wait for the
Federal arrival would mean certain failure in the face of Halleck’s
multitudes. He understood that while he must prepare the defenses
of the town he also had to create a means to strike a blow against
any portion of the Federal juggernaut that exposed itself to
even the odds. To locate such an opportunity he placed brigade
sized elements well forward on the flanks of the Union advance.
These units would keep an eye open for the chance that Beauregard
was waiting for. The chance to strike was slow in coming. Halleck
operating under the watchful eye of Assistant Secretary of War
Thomas A. Scott was determined to avoid another Shiloh like surprise
moved forward in well-coordinated moves followed by entrenchment
at every stop. The painfully cautious advance was made even slower
by the onset of violent rains that made the roads a miry mess.
Nevertheless Halleck trudged forward in short spurts leaving
little chance for successful implementation of his desire to
strike. The Confederate outposts were driven back by the sheer
weight of the solid blue wall. As the Federals armies approached
Corinth the Confederate leader adjusted his defenses but continued
to look for a chance to attack. The approaches to Corinth were
laced with water barriers that posed serious obstacles to the
Union advance in the wet weather. They would force the Union
army to break away from their unified formation to make use of
the available crossings. Halleck was cognizant of the dangers
the crossings posed and warned against a lack of vigilance whenever
they were confronted. Any portion of his army that crossed would
be semi-isolated from assistance by the inability to cross large
bodies of support troops in an emergency. To avoid catastrophe
he insisted on thorough reconnaissance before any passage would
be made. These reconnaissance’s were then to cross back to the
safe side of the river to make their report. As John Pope’s
left wing approached Seven Mile Creek during the first week of
May Beauregard sensed the opportunity he had been waiting for.
Knowing that Pope would have to conduct a reconnaissance of the
area south of the creek to Bridge Creek he laid out his plan
to trap the Federals between the two streams. When the Union
foray came Braxton Bragg would confront them with two divisions
(Ruggles and Trapier) while Earl Van Dorn with three divisions
(Jones, Price, and McCown) marched to an area south of Farmington.
When the Federals focused their attention on Bragg their flank
would be open and Van Dorn could roll them up with an attack
from the south. It was a simple plan but had every chance of
being successful if the Union commanders acted as expected. There
was no bait necessary, Halleck was coming for Corinth and to
get there he had to enter the target area of operations. The
only question were when he would do so; in what strength; and
how careful they would be when they did so. An Opportunity Arises
Beauregard would not have long to wait to find the answers to
these questions. An inpatient John Pope, fresh from his victories
on the Mississippi, soon became disenchanted with the sluggish
pace of the advance. Pope summarized his thoughts; “…from the
very feeble resistance offered to our advance on any of the roads
leading to Corinth and the ease with which close reconnaissance
was made I am inclined to think either the enemy is evacuating
or that he desires to draw us in on this road.” Anxious to move
on with the campaign he lost sight of his own warning. Pope decided,
although he clearly was aware of the danger, to push two divisions
(Stanley and Paine) over Seven Mile Creek toward Farmington.
Indeed he was acting just as Beauregard had hoped. His two divisions
were now isolated and ripe for the picking. Beauregard put his
double barreled plan into action. After moving to within artillery
range of the main Confederate defenses at Corinth the Union reconnaissance
was met by the Confederate skirmishers who greeted the two companies
of the 7th Illinois Cavalry in the lead with a volley that killed
one and wounded two. The supporting infantry column deployed
its skirmishers, the Yates Sharpshooters, and a lively fire followed.
After suffering five casualties (1k, 4w) in the exchange and
the “brisk fire” from the enemy batteries the sharpshooters withdrew.
Fortunately for Pope the forces on his immediate right (Buell)
had not matched his forward thrust as he had requested. Pope
realized the gap he had created on his right posed a real threat.
If the Confederates attacked there he could be cut off from the
remainder of the Federal forces. His concern over the threat
and his orders from Halleck to “avoid any general engagement”
left him no choice but to recall his divisions to await a more
coordinated move with Buell. As an afterthought he ordered Stanley
that “the second brigade of your command (26th Illinois, 47th
Illinois, 8th Wisconsin, and 11th Missouri, under BG Joseph Plummer)
bivouac tonight near the creek and on the side toward Farmington
throwing out pickets so as to inclose the town. They will be
relieved in the morning." While Pope’s belated awareness of
the threat to his right may have saved the majority of his force
the remaining isolated brigade was still available for Beauregard’s
blow from the left. Nevertheless, an over confident Pope reported
his decision to Halleck in a message that night. “I am not likely
to be taken at disadvantage and trust you will not be uneasy
about us.” Beauregard Attacks Near Farmington Colonel John Loomis
(subbing in brigade command for the ailing Plummer) was equally
oblivious to the danger as he deployed his troops. He kept four
companies of the 8th Wisconsin in town to act as an advanced
guard and the remainder of the brigade in a line near the creek
and a cotton gin. He then turned his attention to what he thought
was a more pressing problem. The brigade was out of rations and
there would be no relief until the next morning, May 9th. The
men settled in for what was expected to be a hungry but uneventful
night. Early the next morning troops appeared but not from the
anticipated direction. As Loomis looked to the rear for the scheduled
replacements long lines of Confederate infantry appeared in the
west. These were BG Daniel Ruggles’ and Trapier’s divisions initiating
Beauregard’s plan. Trapier’s line on the left (north) faced no
major opposition and easily pushed back Union skirmishers and
a small group of engineers that were laying corduroy at Nichol’s
Ford. On the Confederate right Ruggles’ troops, mostly Louisianans
marched directly at the isolated Federal brigade. Major John
Jefferson, commanding the Union advance in Farmington, quickly
assessed the situation and informed Loomis that he could not
hold his position long without help. The 0900 request for assistance
was relayed to division commander Stanley who replied that a
brigade (Palmer) from Paine’s division was on the way. This was
the relief that Loomis had been expecting and when they arrived
on the field he requested permission to retire. Stanley, now
on the scene refused and ordered Loomis to remain in support
of the fresh brigade. The help came too late for Jefferson who
was forced to abandon the town under a storm of musketry from
BG Lucius Walker’s brigade in the advance of the Confederate
attack. The Union skirmishers joined the main line at the creek
and awaited the next Confederate move. Ruggles realigned his
forces into one line of battle just outside the eastern edge
of town. The arrangement had Walker’s 3rd Brigade on the right,
BG J. Patton Anderson’s 1st brigade in the center, and BG Daniel
Gober’s 2nd brigade on the left. The 4th Brigade of Col. James
Fagan held a reserve position. The new line pushed Walker’s men
too far south and their contribution to the battle was essentially
over. Anderson and Gober would bear the responsibility for most
of the action. The pause created by Ruggles realignment allowed
Palmer to position his all Illinois troops across the Farmington
Road further east. It was a poorly thought out position as it
masked the fire from Loomis’ brigade and artillery in the rear.
Seeing that he could be of no assistance while Palmer held that
line Loomis ordered the 47th Illinois, 26th Illinois, and 8th
Wisconsin to seek cover by laying down behind a ridge to escape
the artillery fire of the enemy. Additionally the 11th Missouri
was ordered to the far left to occupy a potential artillery position
on a bald knob effectively removing them from further participation
in the fight. The 2nd Iowa Battery was moved into a position
to deliver some counter battery fire. The showdown was set to
begin. A confident Palmer announced that he could hold his position
against “the devil.” It was a promise soon broken. As he approached
his artillery battery (Battery G, 1st Missouri Light) to direct
their fire he was shocked when the commander there asked for
permission to remove his guns to the rear. Taken aback Palmer
asked why they would want to do such a thing in the face of the
enemy. The artilleryman pointed out a long line of enemy troops
(most likely Gober’s brigade) moving to flank them. He explained
there was only enough time to save the guns by retreat. At that
moment a rebel yell and artillery barrage announced