1001_01_Scheldt_Campaign_I "In the Shadow of Arnhem" - PzC 24 Scheldt '44
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| Rating: | 0 (0) |
| Games Played: | 0 |
| SM: | 7 |
| Turns: | 151 |
| Type: | Stock |
| First Side: | Allies |
| Second Side: | Axis |
In the Shadow of Arnhem, 1 October 1944: Though Eisenhower had stressed that opening
Antwerp's port was of utmost significance for continued Allied success in Northwest Europe,
Monty's plan had no chance of achieving quick results. Still focused on the 2nd Army's efforts near
Arnhem and Nijmegen and the pipedream that the British might end the war by Christmas, the Field
Marshall had left the 1st Canadian Army's operations, as important as they were to overall Allied
success, as little more than an afterthought. The Canadian front was impossibly long, complicating
matters of command and logistics. With the 3rd CID still mopping up the last German resistance at
Calais, the II Canadian Corps would not be ready for any major action against the Breskens Pocket
until October 6th. I Corps' divergent attacks to the northeast and northwest violated the basic
military tenet of concentration of force. Though the German 15. Armee was in bad shape after
months of defeat, poor planning and a lack of focus on the part of the Allied leadership along with
adverse weather conditions would ensure that the Battle for the Scheldt would not be won quickly...
[Size: Large]
Design Note: This scenario covers the first half of the Scheldt campaign, from October 1st to the
17th. The German army is badly outmatched and will require skillful leadership. The German
player's best hope is to preserve as much of his force as possible - not every inch of ground needs to
be defended. The German player is advised to pull Kampfgruppe Chill from the front at the earliest
opportunity for use as a mobile reserve.
Players may consider using the "Indirect Fire and Airstrikes by the Map" optional rule to enable the
Walcheren batteries to fire on targets south of the Scheldt.
Antwerp's port was of utmost significance for continued Allied success in Northwest Europe,
Monty's plan had no chance of achieving quick results. Still focused on the 2nd Army's efforts near
Arnhem and Nijmegen and the pipedream that the British might end the war by Christmas, the Field
Marshall had left the 1st Canadian Army's operations, as important as they were to overall Allied
success, as little more than an afterthought. The Canadian front was impossibly long, complicating
matters of command and logistics. With the 3rd CID still mopping up the last German resistance at
Calais, the II Canadian Corps would not be ready for any major action against the Breskens Pocket
until October 6th. I Corps' divergent attacks to the northeast and northwest violated the basic
military tenet of concentration of force. Though the German 15. Armee was in bad shape after
months of defeat, poor planning and a lack of focus on the part of the Allied leadership along with
adverse weather conditions would ensure that the Battle for the Scheldt would not be won quickly...
[Size: Large]
Design Note: This scenario covers the first half of the Scheldt campaign, from October 1st to the
17th. The German army is badly outmatched and will require skillful leadership. The German
player's best hope is to preserve as much of his force as possible - not every inch of ground needs to
be defended. The German player is advised to pull Kampfgruppe Chill from the front at the earliest
opportunity for use as a mobile reserve.
Players may consider using the "Indirect Fire and Airstrikes by the Map" optional rule to enable the
Walcheren batteries to fire on targets south of the Scheldt.
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